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ABSTRACT
A major transformation is occurring in the business model of the jet engine business. The industry focus is
changing from a strict product orientation where spare part sales is the focus to one in which service is an
increasingly important factor. Pratt & Whitney, who had the smallest percentage of the aftermarket
business when this transformation started, has aggressively moved into this arena.
Pratt owns a large number of different aftermarket businesses. Each is run as a stand-alone entity with
profit and loss responsibility. Since there are so many interactions between these businesses, there is a
belief in Pratt management that this profit and loss structure leads to local optimization at the expense of
the greater Pratt. The motivation for this thesis is to take the first step in building a simulation model of
Pratt's aftermarket businesses to determine what structural changes would be required to achieve a global
optimum. This thesis focuses only on one business within the aftermarket, overhaul.
The business model transformation is only now starting to affect the structure of the overhaul business and
how it is operated, so the business I examined is in the midst of significant change. The model and results
that will be presented, therefore, reflect the business, as it has been managed over the last several years, not
how it is being managed going forward. My primary goal with this thesis is to provide insights on the old
business structure that can be used by the new management teams as a guide for implementing their
improvement plans during this growth phase. My secondary goal is to show how system dynamics can be
applied in a business environment like Pratt's aftermarket businesses.
Because the business is going through a growth phase, I concentrated my efforts on understanding what
aspects of the present business structure could impede that growth. The first topic analyzed is the
productivity improvement methodology used by upper Pratt management, which involves reducing
resource levels to motivate improvement. The modeling effort points out the potential impacts of a
productivity shortfall and highlights the need to manage the productivity gap that is created. The second
topic analyzed is the staffing policy used by the business. The modeling effort points out the impact of a
significant learning curve and hiring delay that exist and are not properly being accounted for now. The
third topic presented is a comparative analysis of the present manufacturing system design and the one
proposed by upper management. The modeling effort points out the benefits of moving to the proposed
design.
Thesis Advisors:
Nelson Repenning, Assistant Professor, Sloan School of Management
Daniel E. Whitney, Senior Research Scientist, CTPID, Lecturer, Dept of ME.
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1 Introduction
A major transformation in the business model of the jet engine business has been occurring over the last
five to ten years. The industry focus is changing from a strict product orientation to one in which service is
an increasingly important factor. There are two major drivers of this change. The first driver is the
airlines' emphasis on core competencies and alignment of expense outflows with the revenue stream. The
focus on core competencies is leading to significant outsourcing by the airlines of non-core activities such
as engine maintenance. The focus on expense and revenue alignment by the airline is giving rise to engine
flight hour based service and lease contracts on engines. These long-term service contracts are breaking
down the historical "razor blade" business model, sell the engine at a loss to lock in the revenue stream of
highly marked up spares, because the engine service provider is now carrying the spare replacement costs.
The second driver is increased engine reliability. Engines are staying in service longer and requiring fewer
part replacements' over their life. This is driving down the number of spare engine and spare part sales,
which has historically been the life-blood of the engine OEM. The result of this transformation is that
Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO), which is the service portion of the business, has become the
major source of growth in the engine business.
The OEMs are responding to these changes by expanding their emphasis from spare parts sales to a broader
service based focus. With new engine sales, the emphasis is on bundling maintenance contracts over the
life of the engine to guarantee the MRO revenue streams from the life of those engines. With the existing
engine base, efforts are underway to build market share through both the acquisition (and partnering) of
smaller shops (or airline overhaul facilities that are being spun-off) and more aggressive pricing to increase
share.
This market opportunity in service is greatest for Pratt and Whitney because it has the largest installed base
of any of the three major OEM's, greater than 50% of the engines in service are P&W, and the smallest
market share in MRO2. Pratt realized this opportunity around 1993 and began aggressively growing its
aftermarket business, Pratt and Whitney Engine Services (PWES). Today PWES has a major role in Pratt
achieving its financial objectives.
The service opportunities in the aftermarket are extensive and PWES is aggressively participating in all of
them. As mentioned, spare parts are very expensive so inventory management is a very valuable service in
this market. Pratt participates in this market for both new and used spare parts. Pratt also has engine
overhaul shops and a wide variety of part overhaul and repair facilities. Finally, Pratt has an organization
Statistics indicate that older engines consume themselves 3 times in parts during life while the modern
engines are only projected to consume themselves once (M. Mecham article ).
2 2% as of May 98 according to a Jim Taiclet presentation to the MBA summer intern program on 7/20/98.
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focused on fleet management, the leasing of engines to airlines. All of these businesses are run as stand
alone entities with P&L responsibility. There is a significant amount of interaction between them. In
PWES management there is the belief that the opportunity exists to define a structure between these
businesses that produces a global profit optimum for PWES which is greater than the sum of the local profit
optima for the individual businesses.
The impetus for this thesis is a desire to develop a simulation model of the businesses to enable the search
for a business structure that yields this global optimum. Because of the magnitude of the undertaking, this
thesis takes only the first step in construction of this model. The focus of this thesis is the overhaul
business because it is at the heart of the aftermarket. More specifically, the focus is the impact of the
revenue and profit growth requirements on one particular overhaul line, line_A, in a facility which will be
called Pratt and Whitney Engine Center (PWEC) in this thesis.
1.1 Pratt under the old model
1.1.1 "Razor blade" model
I think it's important to step back and explain the structure of the 'razor blade' business model that has
dominated the industry until recently. The engine OEMs' dependence on spare parts sales is a result of the
ruthless price competition that exists in new engine sales. The airlines want airframes to be qualified with
at least two different engine options, which enables them to gain price leverage over the engine OEMs.
There is a strong incentive on the part of the OEM to get engines into the market and an airline's fleet
because of the combination of long engine life, 15-20 years, and airline learning curve with an engine. By
making a sale the OEM guarantees a future spare part revenue stream and increases the likelihood the
airlines will chose its engines in the future for ease of fleet support. The result of this business model is
that engines have been sold at a loss for sometime. Until the model began changing, the OEMs would
respond to this front-end competition by increasing the markup on spare parts. At the beginning of each
year, finance would adjust the markup percentage based on the projected spare part sales and required
profit margin for the corporation.
1.1.2 Aftermarket service strictly to support sales
The magnitude of the impact of the business model transformation on Pratt cannot be understated. Prior to
the shift in the early '90s, the focus of the organization was primarily on new product development, original
manufacturing and spare parts sales. The company was engineering driven with a strong history of
bringing the latest technology to the market. Within this business model, the aftermarket businesses existed
as a customer service function. They were there to provide services as required by the airlines to support
the existing engine base.
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Since service was perceived as a requirement to do business, but not a core competency, it received little
management attention and investment during this period. This attitude can be seen in the manufacturing
systems that exist in the MRO businesses today versus OEM. In the 1980's while Pratt invested enormous
amounts of time and money into transforming original equipment manufacturing into a lean manufacturing
showplace, the MRO businesses were basically untouched. The manufacturing systems in MRO are only
now starting to catch up to where OEM was almost a decade ago.
1.1.3 Aftermarket fundamentals
Though Pratt was almost solely focused on the spare part sales portion of the aftermarket, parts only
account for approximately 50% of the revenue available in the aftermarket. According to industry analysts,
the engine MRO business was worth $6-9B annually in 95 with approximately 50-75% of this business
being captive within the airlines3 . MRO involves the overhaul and repair of the engine and parts and the
sale of used material. The margins on these businesses are not as high as on spares, however, they are still
attractive.
1.2 Pratt under the new model
1.2.1 Financial driver
Once Pratt acknowledged the transformation that was taking place in the industry, the push began inside to
grow Pratt's share of the aftermarket. Since 1993 the growth has been impressive. Through a combination
of acquisition and expansion, Pratt has grown revenues from $300M in '93 to $ lB in '98 while increasing
margins from 7% to 18%. The goal is to double revenue again to $2B by 2003 while pushing the margins
up to 20%4. PWES is now a major revenue and profit source within the corporation, and the corporation is
dependent on PWES achieving its growth projections to meet Wall street expectations. This new emphasis
on the aftermarket has translated into significant sales and profit growth goals for PWES' existing
aftermarket businesses.
1.2.2 Competitiveness driver
With the business model transformation that has taken place, achieving world class capability in the
aftermarket service businesses is now a major goal of the organization. With this change has come a
significant increase in the level of investment, management attention, and capability of the management
team. PWES is now the hottest area in Pratt for managers to work. These new managers are working
aggressively to improve the productivity of the businesses to make the world class goal a reality and enable
the revenue and profitability growth that are now required of these businesses.
3 J.V. Pincavage, "Greenwich Air Services, Inc.," Analyst Report: Dillon Reed Equity Research, December
29, 1995.
4 Jim Taiclet presentation to Pratt MBA interns, 7/20/98.
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1.3 Project Objective
1.3.1 Optimize across businesses
One of the first actions taken by PWES to increase performance was the institution of profit and loss
responsibility in all of its aftermarket businesses. The goal of this effort was to push decision-making and
ownership as far down into the organization as possible to create the impetus to improve. One of the
results of this decision has been the local optimization of the different businesses. Managers in each
business now make decisions based on the perceived benefit to their individual organization's financial
performance. Because there is a lot of interaction between these businesses, there is a belief within PWES
management that the opportunity exists to modify this structure to improve PWES' overall profitability.
Figure 1-1 below shows the nature of the interaction with the overhaul business feeding parts to the repair
businesses and purchasing parts from new and used spares. The EBIT, earnings before income taxes,
charts on the right show that a potential global EBIT optimum exists which does not align with locally
optimized business structures.
Repair Centers
AIRLINE Parts to be repaired
CUSTOMERS
Engines in ------- Overhaul Center
Spares Engines (PWEC)
Information- - -
Material 
-* 1
Replacement Parts
Spares
Local
REPAIR CENTER Optimum
EBIT
Business Structure
PwEC +
EBIT
Business Structure
SPARES +
EBIT
Business Structure
- Global
PWES 74_ Optimum
EBIT
Business Structure
Figure 1-1: MRO business interactions - EBIT optimization goal
The motivation, and long-term goal, for this thesis is the construction of a framework or model of this
structure that can be analyzed to understand what other configuration opportunities exist.
1.3.2 Project scope
The construction of a model of all of Pratt's aftermarket businesses is beyond the scope of a six-month
internship. To bound the project to a reasonable level for this thesis, the decision was made to concentrate
on the engine overhaul business. Though engine overhaul has the lowest gross margins in the aftermarket,
it is a critical business to control. The facility that handles the engine MRO for a customer has a significant
amount of influence over where the part repair and replacement business is directed. Thus, overhaul
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resides at the very center of PWES' aftermarket businesses, which makes it an ideal place to start the
modeling effort.
This thesis reflects the results of that effort to build a structural model of the overhaul business. It is
important to point out again that Pratt's aftermarket businesses are still in the midst of this transformation.
There are many programs that the new management teams have developed to improve the performance of
these businesses, which are still early in the implementation and adoption stages. PWEC lineA is in this
group. The results, which I will show, thus, reflect more the philosophy and structure of the business as it
had been operated under the old model rather than how it will be operated going forward under the new
model. To provide a focus to the analysis, I concentrate on identifying those aspects of the old business
structure that could prevent PWEC lineA from achieving its growth objectives. My goal with these
insights is to identify important elements in the business, which the new managers should consider as they
go forward.
1.4 Outline of the thesis
Chapter two provides an overview of Pratt's engine overhaul business in PWEC and its demand
environment. Chapter three explains the methodology that is used in the analysis on PWEC and the
rationale for why it has been chosen. Chapter four discusses a passive improvement methodology followed
by PWES and the importance of properly managing it during a growth phase. Chapter five focuses on the
staffing policies that are used by PWEC and the impact of those policies not properly reflecting the learning
curve or hiring delay that exists within the facility. Chapter six discusses the shortcomings of the present
manufacturing system design and compares the performance of the existing job shop design to a flow-line
design being promoted by PWES. Chapter seven contains lessons learned on applying the modeling
methodology to problems of this nature and recommends how future-modeling efforts should be structured.
Finally, the thesis concludes with a wrap-up of the insights.
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2 Overhaul business overview
The intent of this section is to provide an overview of the jet engine overhaul business. This will first be
done through an analogy to an auto repair shop, an operation most people should have an understanding of.
With this analogous reference frame in hand, the important customer metrics will be explained. Next, the
high variability demand environment in which the shop operates will be described. Once these points have
been made, an overview will be given of an overhaul's life cycle, which will be followed by an explanation
of how the human resources are organized in the shop. Finally, the relevant challenges facing the overhaul
facility studied will be detailed.
2.1 Auto repair shop analogy
In the author's initial visit to PWES during the spring, the engine overhaul business was referred to as a
very expensive auto repair business in its basic work content, shop floor scheduling and management.
Though there are areas where the analogy breaks down, by and large the metaphor is an apt one. The work
done in an overhaul is similar to an auto repair facility:
* engine arrives
e diagnosis is performed on the engine and a workscope generated
* cost estimate is generated
* workscope and cost estimate are negotiated with the customer
* upon agreement the engine is disassembled to be repaired
* parts are either racked as OK, shipped out for repair or scrapped (and replacements ordered)
* when parts return, the engine is reassembled
* engine is tested and shipped back to the customer
The analogy also holds with regard to shop organization, which will be discussed later. The major
shortcoming in the analogy is that auto repair shops seldom actually repair parts because the labor cost is so
high relative to the component costs. In the jet engine business repair is the default choice for parts, if
feasible, because of the significant costs of replacement.
2.2 Overhaul customer metrics
To understand the overhaul business one must begin by understanding what is important to the customer.
For airline customers there are three basic categories of metrics: time, cost and quality by which an
overhaul shop is judged.
2.2.1 Time
Time is a critical issue for the airlines because they must carry an inventory of spare engines to support the
fleet while engines are in the overhaul process. The amount of time an engine takes to be overhauled and
the reliability of getting it back on schedule directly impact this inventory level and, thus, the carrying cost
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incurred by the airline. The time metric used in the overhaul business is Turn Around Time (TAT), which
is the calendar time from when the shop receives an engine until it leaves the facility to be shipped back to
the customer. Delivery reliability is the variability metric used to track on-time performance. PWEC
defines it as percent on-time deliveries. From the data at PWEC, and conjectural information on the
industry, this is an area where none of the major players excel, with 80% being considered outstanding.
2.2.2 Cost
Overhaul cost is the second major metric category on which a shop is measured. The typical price of an
overhaul for the engine line analyzed by the author is on the order of a couple million dollars. The
overhaul business is often referred to as a time and materials business because the two major components
of the costs are the labor time required to disassemble and assemble the engine and the material costs of
repairing or replacing worn parts. Between these two cost components, materials account for
approximately 80% of the costs. To a certain extent airlines can trade-off costs versus TAT through the
use of rotable inventory. Rotable inventory is the name given to the customer owned parts inventory
carried by the overhaul shop. It is called rotable because the parts 'rotate' from an engine, through the
repair cycle, to inventory and finally back to a different engine. Rotable inventory enables an airline to
shrink TAT by eliminating the need to wait for a part to return from repair. Parts are pulled from rotable to
rebuild the engine, which speeds its processing. The airline is, thus, trading off time for cost because it
pays additional fees to setup the inventory and use it.
2.2.3 Quality
The final critical metric category to the airlines is quality. There are two quality measures of importance to
the airlines: performance and reliability. The performance metric used is Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT)
margin. EGT margin is the delta between the max exhaust gas temperature at take-off and the FAA
allowed operational limit. The EGT margin reflects the magnitude of tip clearances within the turbine
sections, which correlate to both fuel efficiency and operational time allowed before the next required
overhaul. Because of the thermal cycling in the engine, EGT degrades over time. Reliability relates to the
quality of the overhaul process in the shop: was the engine properly diagnosed, repaired and reassembled.
The metrics used are number of in-flight shutdowns (IFSDs) and number of unexpected engine repairs
(UERs) for a shop in a given time period.
2.2.4 Flexibility
PWEC competes not only on these metrics but also on flexibility. Management advertises PWEC as a
one-stop shop for engine overhaul and repair, and they are willing to take on almost any job. At one level
this translates into a willingness to write contracts of quite differing TAT commitments forthe same engine
line based on different customers willingness to pay for TAT performance through increased rotable
inventory costs. There are customers on the line I studied where the difference in TAT commitment is a
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factor of two because of one's greater willingness to use rotable inventory. On another level, it translates
into a willingness to place customization requests from a customer above the process stability of the shop.
A good example of this is PWEC's willingness to allow airlines to individualize their fit prioritization,
which increases the information processing challenge of the inspectors.
2.3 Sources of variability
An overhaul facility faces many of the same challenges in effectively managing its workload, workforce
and inventory as an auto shop. If the facility has significant visibility with regard to engine arrival timing
and work content, it can plan inventories and level load the shop. Level loading provides benefits to both
the overhaul facility and the airline. The overhaul facility is able to maximize utilization of its resources,
and the airline is guaranteed prompt service. Though the engines are much more expensive and the
airlines more savvy customers than your normal car owner, the visibility provided to the overhaul facility,
as of now, is low so these benefits are not being realized.
2.3.1 Daily demand variability
The result of this communication shortfall is that the overhaul shop is subject to significant demand
variability. I mapped the interarrival time (time between engine arriving to the shop to be overhauled) for
the last three years for PWEC lineA and found that the standard deviation of the interarrival time was
equal to the mean. This is a significant amount of variability. To put it in perspective, for a shop that was
designed for an annual demand of -100 engines, roughly two engines per week, the weekly engine arrival
rate would vary from 0 to 4 engines. Given the large variability, queues inevitably form. This is an issue
for the shop because it is being measured on its TAT, which for contract customers starts when the engine
arrives at the facility. If PWEC lineA is unable to deliver the engine on time, it pays a penalty for every
day that the engine is late to the customer.
2.3.2 Seasonal demand variability
The interarrival variability that PWEC is subjected to is exacerbated by the annual cyclicality of the
industry. The major travel seasons are summer and the holiday season around New Year, so the heavy
overhaul periods are late winter and the start of fall. The demand volume during the high seasons for
engine overhauls can be >50% higher than during the low periods. This exacerbates the challenges in
managing the shop because there are no exceptions made in the contracts for shop workload.
To handle the cyclicality, the shop is intentionally understaffed relative to its projected annual volume by a
fixed percentage. Labor hours have no shelf life (can't be stored), so by understaffmg, the shop is able to
reduce its exposure to this cost during the low demand periods. The result of this approach, however, is
that during the heavy periods, overtime levels for the workforce saturate for a significant length of time.
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2.3.3 Work content
In addition to the engine demand variability, the shop is also subject to work content variation. There are
two levels to this variation: within an engine model and across engine models.
Within a model the variation is due to job type. Similar to an auto, there are FAA defined schedule triggers
for when an engine needs to be serviced and what needs to be overhauled. The major preventative
maintenance driver is rotating component fatigue5 . The components in the hot section of the engine,
combustor and turbines, are subjected to much greater heat, stress and fatigue, so the frequency of overhaul
is greater for that portion of the engine than the cooler compressor. Complete engine overhauls and hot
section only overhauls made up the majority of the engine shop visits for PWEC lineA, but they were not
the only work. In addition to overhauls, the shop also performed modification upgrades, repairs (such as
compressor blade failures) and engine investigations. Often the shop would both repair and overhaul an
engine if it was brought in for the repair near the required PM time. The work content on these jobs varies
both by the type of job being performed and the extent of damage to an engine.
Across engine models, the variation is due to product design differences and the associated problems
required in supporting a family of slightly different products. These differences can be significant
depending on the magnitude increase in thrust power from one model to the next within a family. On
line_A, the largest engine in the family was quite different than the smallest with additional stages in the
major rotating modules of the engine.
2.4 Overhaul life cycle
The life cycle of an overhaul is broken down into three distinct phases: induction, the repair window and
assembly. This is a serial process for individual parts and subassemblies, but there is overlapping of the
phases. Figure 2-lindicates what the TAT breakdown and overlap would be between the major process
steps if the overhaul took 100 days6 . The overlapping exists because of the stacked nature of the assembly.
The four major rotating modules (from front to back they are Low Pressure Compressor (LPC), High
Pressure Compressor (HPC), High Pressure Turbine (HPT) and Low Pressure Turbine (LPT)) in the engine
are assembled onto a pair of concentric shafts. The disassembly process starts from the outside of this
stacked assembly and works in, which is why the LPC and LPT are the first two modules shown
completing induction in the figure. The reverse is true for the assembly process. The engines are treated as
5There are two types of fatigue triggers. The first is time and cycle fatigue which translates into limits for
operational hours and take-off /landing cycles on the rotating parts. The second is temperature limit
fatigue. There is an allowable limit on the exhaust gas temperature (EGT) of the engine during take-off.
There are a complex set of FAA rules regarding these EGT excursions and how long the engine can be
flown following them before requiring an overhaul
6 Throughout this thesis a 100-day TAT has been used for examples, and does not reflect actual TAT of
PWEC lineA.
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individual projects in the shop, and the progress of each is tracked relative to its own schedule. The
schedules are generic for a given engine model.
LPC
LPT Process breakdown for a
HPC generic 100 day TAT
Induction - 27 days
(diag, disassy, inspect)
Repair window -60 days
(track parts, procure replacements)
Assembly - 36 days
(assembly, test, prep for ship)
HPC/
HPT
LPT/
LPC
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 75 90 90 100
TAT (in days)
Figure 2-1: Process schedule breakdown
The induction process consists of the engine diagnosis, disassembly and part inspection. Diagnosing an
engine is a convoluted process, which can involve the airline and PWVEC's customer service and
engineering groups. Once a workscope has been agreed upon with the customer, the engine is started
through the process. For a complete overhaul this entails removing all external components and 'chunking'
the engine down into subassemblies and modules to be sent to their respective areas. For partial overhauls
the disassembly process will vary depending on what portion of the engine is the focus of the overhaul.
As the parts are removed, they are segregated by section7 onto shelves for the inspectors to review. The
parts are reviewed and dispositioned into one of three categories: OK for assembly, repair or scrap. The
majority of the information that the inspector uses for inec32ng and documenting parts is in paper form
which is why information retrieval and processing require a significant amount of effort in the inspection
process. The issues with this paper inspection process are explained in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Once the inspection process is complete, parts enter the repair window. From PWVEC's perspective this is
the most challenging portion of the process because it is the one over which they have the least control.
External Pratt business units or suppliers handle the majority of the repairs. The goal is to have the right
7 PWEC has broken the engine and modules down into ~32 lettered sections to facilitate their paperwork
processing. The sections are usually identifiable subassemblies.
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parts available in time for assembly to begin on schedule. The PWEC material handling group tracks the
progress of only those components in the repair cycle that they feel have the greatest potential to impact the
assembly schedule for that engine. Parts are procured from the rotable pool to replace components that are
expected to arrive late. This process is called buying-to-expedite (BTE). If a part does not arrive on
schedule, the shop scrambles to find a replacement that will allow assembly to begin. If the part is in
rotable inventory a BTE will be done. If not, the shop will 'swap' an OK part from an engine from the
same customer that is further upstream in the process. Delivery reliability from the repair vendor base is a
significant problem, so the organization is regularly scrambling to find parts.
The assembly process, as I define it, consists of the re-assembly of the engine and final test. As mentioned
above, the progress of the engine through the shop is monitored against its schedule. The detailed schedule
indicates when each of the 32 sections should be released to its required place for assembly. Following the
assembly of each section, the section is inspected and any necessary assembly measurements are taken.
When assembly is completed, the engine is run through a series of performance tests to validate the quality
of the overhaul. After test, a final inspection is made and the engine is packaged up and sent back to the
airline. The TAT clock stops on the overhaul when it leaves the facility.
2.5 Shop structure
2.5.1 Manufacturing system design
Historically, PWEC lineA's manufacturing system perfectly fit the auto repair shop analogy. Similar to a
large auto shop, the facility was configured as a job shop with a collection of bays where engines could be
brought in and worked on. This had been the default design because of the perceived flexibility in
accommodating the demand variability. As long as there were resources available (manpower, tooling and
the appropriate parts) an engine could be worked on. The bay design allowed engines to be parallel
processed as demand dictated.
This design has changed over the last few years under the new management team. These changes have
been made to improve the TAT. First, the modules have been split out to dedicated areas, or work cells, by
module type. Second, a focused induction area has been created through which most engines are funneled
for disassembly and inspection. The only area in which the bay design remains untouched is engine
assembly.
Though the manufacturing system is not a pure job shop at this point, I mention the historical design
because the culture has not caught up with the physical process changes. The floor is managed based on
engine schedule priority. Resources are allocated to an engine based on where it is relative to its schedule
goal. When there is a resource constraint, which is a common occurrence, resources are allocated to those
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engines closest to the end of the process. Under this operational philosophy, the focus is always on the
near-term goal of getting engines out the door. The result of this policy is that engines earlier in the process
are starved for resources until they move up in the prioritization queue. As in a classic job shop, priority is
given to the individual job over maintaining flow throughout the overhaul process.
2.5.2 Human resources
There are three categories of workers that are involved in the overhaul process: mechanics, inspectors and
material handlers (marshalling). These groups have distinct responsibilities throughout the process. There
is almost no resource reallocation between the groups because of the union and FAA requirements8 . The
inspectors and mechanics are the two core resource groups that are directly engaged in the overhaul process
and there is approximately an equal number of each. The mechanics are responsible for disassembling and
re-assembling the engine. The inspectors are responsible for the inspection and disposition of parts in the
induction process (called BX), the inspection of incoming parts from the repair cycle and the rotable pool
(called CX) and the inspection of completed assemblies in the assembly process (called LX). The material
handlers support the movement of material through the in-house processes and manage the material while it
is in the repair cycle. There is only a quarter the number of expeditors as the other two groups. The
analysis in this thesis focuses solely on the inspectors and mechanics because they are the core resource
groups in the process. It is important to note that PWEC has put in place plans to collapse the inspector and
mechanic categories to achieve more efficiency and flexibility in the workforce.
As mentioned above, The shop floor has been split into two major areas: modules and engines. All the
induction and assembly processes for a given component take place within the allocated area, so all the
work on the High Pressure Compressor (HPC), for example, will take place in the HPC module area.
Inspectors and mechanics tend to stay within their area, i.e. modules, but work across the processes
(induction and assembly) performed there.
2.6 Important issues about the facility
As mentioned in the introduction, PWES is now the major source of revenue and profitability growth for all
of Pratt. These expectations have been passed on to PWEC. The issues that will be analyzed in this thesis
all relate at some level to the challenges in achieving these growth goals.
2.6.1 Productivity improvement methodology
The first issue that will be discussed is the passive methodology (called tasking) that is used by PWES to
drive productivity improvement into PWEC. Tasking occurs during the annual planning cycle. PWEC
submits its bottom's up estimate of the resource levels required for the upcoming year to PWES, which is
8 The key distinction between the two resource groups, inspectors and mechanics, is that inspectors are the
only individuals authorized by the FAA to designate a part, assembly or engine as being airworthy.
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then 'tasked' down a fixed percentage. Stressing the organization to encourage improvement is a common
methodology used in Pratt. My analysis shows that the use of this methodology needs to be properly
moderated during a growth phase because of the implications of a productivity shortfall.
2.6.2 Manpower planning
The second issue that will be discussed in this thesis is the manpower planning methodology that is in use
at PWEC. As will be explained in more detail later, there exists a significant learning curve in the
overhaul process for the mechanics and inspectors because of the manufacturing system design, some
infrastructure shortcomings and the general complexity of the product and its FAA and technical
documentation. The present process used for planning headcount for a given year fails to capture the
distribution of the workforce on this learning curve. This is an issue in a growth period because the method
overestimates the productive capacity of the shop, which causes it to understaff in the short term relative to
the required workload. A model of PWEC lineA's overhaul process has been built to show the impact of
this manpower planning methodology.
2.6.3 Manufacturing system design
PWES has decided that PWEC lineA needs to migrate its manufacturing system design from this modified
bay concept to a flow line design9 , similar to what is used in original manufacturing, to further reduce its
TAT and improve productivity. The flow-line design is radically different from a bay concept because
It constrains all the engines to flow through a defined series of stations, which make up the line. No longer
would the facility be able to start an engine into the process simply because floor space and manpower is
available. There is significant concern within the facility as to whether a flow-line can accommodate the
demand variability that the shop experiences. The final section of the thesis focuses on this question of
what the manufacturing system design should be for the overhaul business. The sensitivity of the
competing designs to demand variability is analyzed and from this conclusions are drawn on the negative
effect of the existing operational policy.
9 Flow-line: lean manufacturing system where process is broken down into a series of balanced stations
with defined process steps in each station.
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3 Methodology
The choice of a modeling methodology for this project was driven by the long-term goal to develop a
business simulation model of the entire aftermarket. The aftermarket contains a diverse set of inter-related
businesses, so the modeling technique needs to be capable of representing and modeling a complex system.
System dynamics was chosen because it has been used successfully to achieve this goal in a wide variety of
similarly complex applications. As will be explained in this section, there are two stages to developing a
dynamic model of a system. The first stage involves identifying the structural elements and relationships
that exist between the elements, which create the dynamics being seen. The second involves translating
that structural understanding into an analytical model, which can be used for simulating system behavior
and testing improvement scenarios. System dynamics excels in both these stages.
3.1 Attributes of the methodology
3.1.1 Causal loops - Identifying complex system structure
The first stage of a modeling project involves identifying the structure that generates the behavior of
interest. In complex systems this is a challenge for two reasons. First, there is a time component to the
system's response to a given input, which is often misinterpreted by individuals within the system. The
time response of the system varies for different inputs, so it is difficult for an individual to discern which
decision caused a given response, especially if there is a large time lag involved 0 . Second, there is seldom
a single individual whose detailed knowledge and influence spans the entire system. The knowledge of
individuals within the system is usually limited to their span of control, be that organizational or physical.
Because there is no comprehensive understanding of the larger system, each component is managed as
though it was stand-alone. Over time these individuals develop simple 'mental models' of how the system
operates based on the inputs and outputs they have visibility to. These mental models seldom correlate
across the system.
Causal loop mapping is a tool for graphically representing the important variables of a system and their
interrelationships. These maps are developed through interviews and /or group brainstorming sessions with
the individual decision-makers within the system. Through the collection of these various simple mental
models, an understanding of the larger system structure is developed and a causal loop diagram built. The
value of causal loop mapping is that the diagrams bring everyone within the system to a common and more
complete understanding of the relevant structure of that system. The loop diagrams also convey, at a
conceptual level, the structure within the system that is creating the behavior of interest. In many systems,
1 The inertia of the system will dictate the magnitude of the phase lag that exists between a given input and
its response. If a large time lag exists, individuals often will miss the correlation that exists between the
input and response.
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the mapping alone provides sufficient insight into the structure to devise policies to modify the behavior of
interest.
Causal loop diagrams are so described because the system is always drawn as a collection of feedback
loops. Only those variables that impact system feedback are considered because the goal is to understand
the dynamic response of the system. Causal loop diagrams consist of two types of loops: balancing loops
and reinforcing loops. In balancing loops the behavior of the system drives the variable of interest to an
externally set reference level. Balancing loops are inherently stabilizing. Reinforcing loops, on the other
hand, are not. In reinforcing loops the behavior of the system drives the variable of interest in a given
direction unbounded. In a system that has a combination of balancing and reinforcing loops, the system
will remain stable as long as the balancing loops dominate. Once the reinforcing loops gain momentum,
the system goes unstable. Causal loop modeling is valuable for identifying the structure but it is not a tool
that can quantitatively answer whether a system will remain stable or when a reinforcing loop will start to
dominate. It is a static representation of system structure.
3.1.2 Simulation modeling
It is in this next stage, simulation modeling, where a quantitative model of the system is built to determine
the impact of the interactions of the different loops. These two stages are complementary both in their
construction and insights. The simulation model is built to reflect the structure identified in the causal loop
modeling. The benefit of the simulation model is conceptual validation of the causal loops and scenario
testing. It is impossible for individuals to intuit the dynamics of a complex system with more than a few
feedback loops. For a given system input, the simulation's output can be analyzed to determine the
efficacy of the model and the causal structure that supported it. This analysis can involve comparing the
output either to reality or to the decision-makers perception of how the system would perform depending
on which is most feasible and relevant. Once there is acceptance of the model's validity, it can be used for
scenario and sensitivity testing. System structural changes can be devised and tested quickly in the
simulation model to determine their effectiveness before being deployed on the real system. The final
value of the simulation model is as a sales tool to management and the organization. Simulation results can
be used to quantify the value of a change to management. If everyone in the organization has bought into
the assumptions on which the model is based, there should be agreement on the output.
3.2 Applicability to PWEC
System dynamics is a powerful tool for analyzing PWEC because the business consists of a collection of
interdependent groups and processes with significant time varying components that affect system
performance. There are time lags within the system that are not well understood. There are also
managers within the larger system that control PWEC who do not fully understand the dynamic structure of
the overhaul business. The modeling effort provides benefits on both these fronts. It quantifies some of the
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system time lags as well as their impact. It also provides an educational tool, which can be used to explain
the dynamic structure of the overhaul business as it is presently configured.
Both stages of the modeling technique were used in this analysis and can provide valuable insights for
managers within the system. The causal loop analysis provides insight into the potential impact of PWES'
methodology for driving productivity improvement into PWEC. The simulation model provides insights
into the impact of the present staffing policy given the learning curve that presently exists in the
organization. It also quantifies the value of changing the manufacturing system design and operating
policy. The following three sections will explain these insights from the modeling effort in detail.
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4 Productivity improvement methodology
Pratt & Whitney is a firm believer in the value of pushing profit and loss (P&L) responsibility as far down
into the organization as possible to drive accountability and motivate local management teams. PWES
corporate management approach is consistent with this. In PWEC there are two levels of P&L
responsibility, plant level and engine line level. The plant general manager (GM) is responsible for the
total performance of the shop". A line GM is responsible for the performance of his individual business
unit: sales, marketing, operations & finance. Because the businesses are run as P&L's, PWES manages
them through a collection of metrics, which are reviewed on a monthly basis. In alignment with the P&L
philosophy, a GM's financial compensation package is heavily incentivized to his unit's performance on
the metrics. Everything is, thus, setup to insure that the GM is motivated to keep his line focused on what
PWES perceives is important. In addition to the business performance metrics, PWES sets a productivity
improvement level, which is defined as the tasking percentage, that a business is forced to achieve. This
section will focus on that improvement methodology and the potential ramifications of not properly
managing it during a growth phase.
4.1 PWES metrics and business unit response
4.1.1 PWES metrics
The metrics PWES uses to track an engine line's performance can be split into four basic categories:
financial, customer service, quality, and safety. The performance of a business unit is tracked relative to
the expectations set forth for each metric by PWES at the beginning of the year. The metrics are as
follows:
Financial:
" EBIT: earnings before interest and taxes. (operating profit)
* Total revenue: total revenue from sales:
Customer service:
* TAT: turn around time (average by engine model)
e Meeting customer commitment: % on time deliveries
Quality:
e Customer complaints: these are call backs for problems which are field fixable
" Customer returns: engines that have been pulled off wing and returned because of a
mistake in the overhaul process.
* Customer scorecards.
Safety:
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e Injuries on the job, days lost to injury, etc..
From discussions with the GM of line__A, I found that the financials dominate in importance, followed by
the customer service metrics. Together these four metrics account for 90% of PWES' attention. Total
revenue and EBIT are given equivalent importance in the monthly reviews because the failure of meeting
either will impact Pratt's bottom line. Until the financials are at or above expectation level, the GM stated
that he has little control over his business because he can't freely allocate money. The quality metrics are
given less priority in PWES reviews because quality failures are infrequent and dealt with on a case by case
basis. It is the behavioral impact of the dominant time and cost metrics that is analyzed in this thesis.
4.1.2 PWEC response to metrics
In this period of high growth expectations for PWES, growing the business is a requirement to meet the
revenue goal. According to the lineA GM, 65% of his time is spent on sales and marketing related
activities. There are two basic mechanisms that the GM uses to build sales: awareness building and what I
define as 'promises'. From my six months PWEC it is obvious that a significant amount of the GM's time
is spent visiting, touring and communicating with customers on the capability that his line either presently
has or is working to build. In some cases this is a technical capability that is being developed. In others it
is the benefit of a proposed process change, as in the case of the manufacturing system redesign from a job
shop structure to flow-lines. The number of overhaul service providers is relatively small, and the airlines
have a basic awareness of the relative strengths and costs of these different providers; so in many cases
PWEC lineA is growing through customer acquisition from competitors. To entice these airlines to
switch, the GM sells the projected productivity improvement, in the form of reduced TAT or overhaul cost,
of the process change. Through these actions the GM builds his sales to meet the revenue expectation.
This dynamic is expressed graphically as the "get more customers" balancing loop in the causal diagram
shown in Figure 4-1. The marketing actions taken by the GM in the business unit are proportional and in
response to the gap that exists between the unit's revenue and PWES' expectation.
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" This redundant layer of general management has since been eliminated. All the line GMs have been
rescoped to operations managers. The plant GM is now the sole individual with P&L.
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Figure 4-1: Response to revenue expectation
It is important to point out that many of the new sales are structured around the projected performance of
the shop because this implies that profit margins on future contracts will be lower if performance does not
improve. On top of the growth in revenue expectations, PWES also is demanding an increase in profit
margin. PWEC line_A, therefore, needs to reduce its cost structure at a ratefaster than what it is promising
its customers. To achieve these improvements, PWEC lineA has two basic options: increase productivity,
i.e. "work smarter", or demand more of the organization, "work harder" (Figure 4-2).
PWEC line A
Sales (# of SVs)?-&0. PWE
A Re
C line PWEC line A
venue Costs -
(9 i
Emphasis on
B cost cutting Work Smarter
Work harder
loop
PWES mgmt
IT pressure on PWECETProfitability line A to increase
gap + EBIT
PWES EBIT +
expectation
Emphasis on
productivity
mprovement
+4-
Figure 4-2: Response to EBIT expectation
Of these two options the first is the most sustainable, but the second has the fastest response time. The
new management teams in PWES and PWEC have brought consultants in to facilitate kaizens to enable the
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organization to change the manufacturing system design to the more effective flow-line. These efforts
support the work smarter loop.
4.2 Annual planning and improvement tasking
4.2.1 Planning process
The method PWES historically has used to drive productivity improvements into the business units is
defined as tasking. Tasking takes place during the annual budgeting cycle. A business unit develops a
bottoms-up estimate of the manpower and rotable inventory resources it requires to achieve the projected
sales volume at its current productivity level' 2 . This bottoms-up estimate is then tasked, which means
reduced by the desired improvement percentage, for that resource category for the subsequent year. The
business unit, therefore, begins each year with a lower resource allotment than their recent performance
deems they require. In PWEC both of the major resource categories, manpower and materials, are tasked.
From PWES perspective, this provides an impetus to improve as well as forces a lower cost base to occur
which has the following benefits:
e PWEC lineA becomes a more attractive service provider, which facilitates sales growth.
This effect is explained by the "Cheaper to customer" loop in Figure 4-3.
* PWEC lineA improves its profit margin. This effect is explained by the "Projected
improvement from tasking" loop in Figure 4-3.
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Figure 4-3: Projected result of productivity tasking
12 Information systems capability is a major issue for PWEC. The systems are so poor that the data used
for annual manpower planning was over a year old. 1998 manpower planning was done using summary
data from overhauls completed in 1996. The new ERP systems will dramatically improve the planning
process by providing current data.
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4.2.2 Philosophy behind tasking
The belief, which underpins tasking, is that organizations will not change unless the pain of the additional
work is greater than the anxiety caused by upsetting the status quo. It is only through this reduction in
resources that an organization will develop the motivation to reorganize or redesign processes that are
inefficient because they no longer have the capacity to operate that way and still meet their performance
metrics. To state it in terms of the causal loops, the intent of tasking is to drive the organization into the
"work harder" loop to motivate them to migrate to the "work smarter" loop. This attitude toward
organizational change that tasking represents is a reflection of Pratt's culture. Pratt is a reactive company.
A challenge or crisis needs to be placed in front of an organization in Pratt before it will respond.
I understand the intent of this methodology as a motivation tool, however, there are risks inherent in it. If
the organization fails to achieve the improvement goals, its performance will be negatively impacted. The
intent of my analysis is to determine the impact of a productivity shortfall, and the magnitude of the
performance degradation associated with it.
4.3 Impact of improvement shortfalls
I chose to examine the impact of potential productivity shortfalls because interviews indicated that the shop
in the past had not achieved the PWES productivity goal. Discussions with the operations managers
revealed that manpower productivity had been relatively constant over the last several years. It was made
clear to me in these interviews that the operations managers do not respond to the tasking as a motivational
tool but as a resource tax whose impact they need to minimize. This is reflected in the long-range planning
process. The managers project manpower requirements out assuming an X% year over year productivity
improvement as requested for PWES long-range planning; however, they then reset the reference man-
hours per engine each year thereby preventing the tasking from compounding. Because the organization is
always slightly understaffed, the organizational bias is toward "working harder". The general consensus in
the organization is that they are usually too busy to focus on improvement work, which indicates
productivity shortfalls will occur. To determine the impact on the system of productivity shortfalls in the
two resource categories, scenarios were generated through causal loop modeling13.
4.3.1 Labor productivity shortfall
The first scenario developed was for a labor productivity shortfall only. Assuming that the planned sales
volume occurs, this shortfall will result in the organization lacking the processing capacity necessary to
finish all assembly and disassembly tasks on schedule. Since the organization places more emphasis on
the back-end (assembly side) of the process, resources will be shifted from disassembly to assembly, which
causes the disassembly tasks to fall behind schedule. Thus, a labor productivity shortfall will initially show
13 This portion of the causal loop model was not translated into the simulation model for sensitivity analysis
due to a lack of hard data and time.
page # 35
up as engines entering the repair window late. This induction delay results in a decrease in the available
repair window. Assuming a constant repair processing time, this delay causes the repair window gap
(difference between time allotted for the repair by PWEC and time required for the repair by the vendor) to
grow. If nothing is done, the assembly schedule will be impacted when the engine reaches that stage in the
process. To prevent this from occurring, marshalling will respond to the repair window gap by increasing
the number of buy-to-expedites (BTEs) from the rotable pool. If the rotable pool is sufficient, the result of
this is increased costs to the customer through BTE fees (See the "rotables expensive" loop in Figure 4-
4)14
4.3.2 Rotable pool productivity shortfall
The second scenario developed was for a shortfall in rotable productivity. Rotable productivity is
measured in inventory turns by dollar volume (total sales $/ average rotable inventory $). The rotable pool
size for a given sales volume and TAT is a function of:
* The size of the repair window allotted for a given part by PWEC lineA. Assuming the
disassembly and assembly processes require a fixed amount of time, the allotted repair
window is the difference between the required TAT and the sum of these processes. If my
generic 100-day TAT case requires 50 days for disassembly and assembly then there are 50
days available for the repair window. If the disassembly and assembly processes are not
improved, a 75-day TAT would require a 25 day repair window.
e The processing time and delivery reliability of the repair vendor base. As the repair vendors
reduce their cycle times and improve their delivery reliability, PWEC lineA is able to carry
less rotable inventory.
* PWEC lineA's ability to properly predict which parts will require repair and, thus, need
inventory coverage. Part selection for the rotable pool is a very inexact science based on the
marshalling organization's knowledge of the historical issues with an engine type.
Because PWES is demanding significant TAT improvements from all the businesses in the aftermarket, the
emphasis here is on reducing vendor TAT and improving PWEC lineA's selection of parts to stock in
rotable. For lineA to achieve its TAT improvement goals, it is shrinking its allotted repair window. The
goal is for the vendor's window to shrink faster. So, the scenario is as follows. Assuming that the planned
sales volume occurs, the rotable productivity shortfall will result in an increased probability of stock-outs in
the rotable pool. There are three potential results of this occurring.
1. An OK part is "swapped" from an engine farther upstream in the process. There is a charge
for this, which drives up the cost of the overhaul.
14 Given that the rotable pool of parts was not originally configured assuming that parts with this short of a
repair time would be required, this scenario is the ideal case. In reality, the shop would most likely stock-
out.
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2. If available, a new part is purchased and charged to the customer. The repaired part will then
become rotable. Cases 1 & 2 are combined in the "Swaps or New expensive" loop in Figure
4-4.
3. If unavailable, the assembly process is delayed which disrupts the shop and often leads to a
missed delivery date and increased TAT. This is the "late and unreliable" loop in Figure 4-4.
Assembly _ _ - Prob of Engine
Delay .*tokot . Repair
stockout + Window Required
Gap - Engine
+ ailable Repair
+ Engine Window
- + Late & Swaps or new Repair
unreliable part buys BT
Cust Delivery Time required for
Perf. Avg. TAT Tm eurdfr (
Avg Overhaul assy & disassy Swaps or New
Cost R expensive
Rotables Manpower Product Gap
PWEC line A expensive Product Gap
Attractiveness Actual 
- Actual Rotable
ProductivityP+
Required Required Rotable
PW EC line A Manpower Productivity (turns)
Sales (# of SV's) Productivity
+ A~' otted
PWE line A Manpower AllottedRvelne ARotable
Revenue -- EBIT Inventory
Profitability PWES mgmt 'Tasking'
PWES EBIT gap pressure on + expectation to
expectation + + PWEC line A to-y force impr.
increase EBIT
Figure 4-4: Impact of productivity shortfall (modified Figure 4-3)
4.3.3 Combined effect
These loops show that the costs savings achieved through tasking are competing with the cost increases
generated from the workarounds if productivity shortfalls occur. The reduction in headcount and carrying
costs are being transformed into workaround fees to the customer and a greater probability of a delivery
delay. Productivity shortfalls in both resource categories also compound each other, magnifying the
problems that occur. A shortfall in workforce productivity translates into a reduced available repair
window, which strains the capability of the rotable pool because it demands either a larger pool or more
responsive vendor base. This compounding occurs because the resources share a common single buffer
mechanism, the engine repair window. For any shortfall in the productivity of a resource, the organization
responds by trying to recover in the repair window, and the resources require that the window size move in
opposite directions. The window needs to shrink to compensate for a manpower productivity shortfall
while it needs to grow to compensate for a rotable pool productivity shortfall.
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4.4 Systemfeedback effects
In the context of the causal loop analysis, these shortfalls create destructive reinforcing loops because they
drive down PWEC lineA's attractiveness leading to reduced sales, which for a given cost structure
reduces EBIT creating a vicious cycle. Though these are 'dangerous' loops, if this were the only impact of
productivity shortfalls, I do not believe their momentum would ever grow to dominate the system.
However, the potential costs and delays of these loops are just the tip of the performance degradation
iceberg that results from a productivity shortfall.
4.4.1 Workaround costs
The above loops are only a fraction of the problem because of the enormous labor drain resulting from
workarounds. The paperwork requirements for performing a part exchange (BTE or swap) are laborious in
PWEC because of FAA requirements and antiquated information systems. Besides the task of finding and
updating multiple paper copies of the documentation for the engines involved, replacement parts need to be
re-inspected, and major rotating parts require interface measurements (fits & clearances) to be taken to
insure that the resulting assembly is viable. If the assembly is not viable, a new replacement part needs to
be found. Significant man-hours can be invested in finding the interface parts and documentation, taking
the measurements, and updating the paperwork to insure that a part selected for replacement is acceptable
and the paper trail completed. All of this additional work is done by a group of inspectors that are
responsible both for incoming material inspection which BTEs and swaps fall into, CX, and disassembly
inspection, BX. CX accounts for -20% of the total inspection workload. As the CX work content
increases to facilitate the workarounds, there are fewer inspectors available to process the engines in BX.
This is depicted in Figure 4-5 as the "workarounds drain resources" loop.
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Figure 4-5: Workarounds drain resources (modified Figure 4-3)
4.4.2 Result of workarounds
This is a powerful reinforcing loop, and according to individuals within the facility it is the one that can
develop the momentum to destabilize the system. Individuals within PWEC were very vocal about this
loop and feel it is here that PWES management does not understand the impact of their tasking policy.
This is also where I believe the danger with this approach lies. This destructive feedback loop compounds
any shortfall in productivity by further driving down the work capacity of the shop, which feeds its inability
to meet its customer commitments. Once this reinforcing loop builds momentum, the shop performance
steadily deteriorates until the workload slacks to allow the organization to catch up.
4.5 Conclusions on tasking
In this chapter I have highlighted the risks inherent in the tasking philosophy. Unlike in some
organizations where the performance degradation is proportional to the shortfall, the potential degradation
here is much greater because of the destructive dynamics that can develop. I understand, though, that this
approach is necessary to an extent to motivate the organization. In this section, I will point out the insights
that I believe management should take away from this analysis on tasking.
4.5.1 Tasking should be moderated during growth phase
Since the focus of this thesis is growth, I will deal with this issue first. I think it's very important that the
management team moderate the gap that results from tasking as PWEC goes through this growth phase.
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As the volume of work grows, the organization either needs to be increasing its productivity accordingly or
adding additional resources. Since new resources are not productive right away, the organization cannot
respond very quickly if the gap becomes unmanageable. If the organization falls far enough behind, the
destructive dynamics described above will build momentum, which will further widen the gap and degrade
performance.
I think tasking should be very closely monitored during the growth phase also because of its impact on the
sales effort. Any performance drop-off hurts the GM's efforts to sell the shop's capability. I actually
believe that the resource level should be set to achieve the desired performance level for the given demand
and additional resources added in the short term to focus on productivity improvements. The advantage of
a growth phase is that these additional resources will be absorbed as the demand grows. Because of the
poor average performance in the MRO business on metrics such as delivery reliability, PWEC has the
opportunity to make significant market share gains if it's able to perform up to expectation. This, however,
requires a short-term profitability trade-off for the market share gain.
4.5.2 PWEC infrastructure makes improvement difficult
The second insight regards how the improvement efforts should be pursued. Pratt is a lean manufacturing
company. It has had dramatic success using the Kaizen format to achieve productivity improvements in its
OEM businesses. These events usually involve shutting down the process (or portion thereof) for a week
or two at a time to dedicate the workforce on improvement activity. I participated on two of these events in
PWEC as part of the recent management push to redesign the manufacturing system into a flow-line. From
my experience, I think that this short format alone will not suffice in PWEC unless augmented for two
reasons.
4.5.2.1 Resources required to develop improved system designs
First, the major areas that remain to be improved in PWEC require a significant research effort to determine
acceptable system designs. I believe this is different than in OEM where the assembly processes are fixed
and the information required to do the design can be captured in a short period of time. As an example, one
of the major focus areas is shadow racking for part presentation at assembly. Right now parts for a given
section of an engine are stored on a specific shelf of a rack but not organized. Mechanics spend a
significant amount of time searching the shelf to find each successive part. Developing shadow racking for
PWEC is a challenge because there are so many different degrees of disassembly. The racks cannot simply
be designed assuming full teardown because few engines will be completely disassembled. One of the
iFnes in PWEC actually designed shadow racking for a complete HPC overhaul and was told by the
mechanics that it was incomplete without the flexibility to deal with partials. They need to develop flexible
racking that can easily be configured for the majority of the cases they see. Designing and deploying this
racking is not feasible to achieve without dedicating experienced mechanic resources to it from the shop
floor.
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4.5.2.2 Present information systems hinder improvement efforts
Second, PWEC's processes are constrained by the capability of their information system because of the
documentation requirements of aerospace, and their present system is severely lacking. For example, there
is an enormous amount of non-value-added work within the inspection processes because of the
shortcomings of the IT infrastructure. Three major pieces of documentation are generated on every engine
for the inspection process. The IT systems do not support the integration of this information, so the
inspector is required to customize it at the bench while inspecting parts. The information systems also do
not support on-line data collection, so the inspection information resides only in the stacks of paper that
have been manually filled out. This manual system leads to significant search and processing times when
changes need to be made. The paperwork also requires significant resources downstream to review it for
accuracy. The IT system needs to be upgraded and redesigned for the inspection processes to be
significantly streamlined.
The poor IT system also hinders data collection for improvement efforts. Engine overhaul involves many
long cycle-time processes. It is very time-consuming to manually capture a statistically significant sample
size of information to characterize a process. The present information system does not enable this
information to be culled from it. Thus, major process redesign efforts are hindered by a lack of data. The
IT issues will be discussed more in future chapters.
I believe that it is, at least partially, because of these reasons that the organization historically has failed to
improve under tasking and come to view it as a resource tax. The management teams in place at the time
did not invest in the infrastructure changes required to support significant improvement. As an example of
this one only needs to look at the five attempts to redesign the IT system which were cancelled because of
the investment required.
4.5.3 Going forward
4.5.3.1 Improvement efforts underway
The new management teams of PWES and PWEC, unlike their predecessors, are acknowledging that these
improvements require additional resources and are taking steps to provide them. Some of the programs,
which have been deployed in the last few years to focus on the infrastructure, are:
- Achieving Competitive Excellence (ACE). This program has been created to focus on lean initiatives
in the facilities and resources have been provided in each facility to work on these tasks.
" Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software. Pratt as a corporation last year announced a company
wide implementation. This is a major first step in streamlining the antiquated IT systems that are a
barrier to process improvement in PWEC.
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m Electronic fits and clearances program. Consulting resources have been hired into PWEC to redesign a
smaller component of the IT system, which can be completed in advance of ERP, that will dramatically
reduce the inspector paperwork, rework, and search times.
- Supplier-gating plan. This program has been started in PWES to ensure that the internal supplier
repair windows shrink at the rate necessary to support the required TAT reductions in PWEC.
4.5.3.2 Future management challenges
Historically, the tasking percentage has been a fixed rate year in and year out regardless of the situation in
the shop. This must change going forward. The comments from people in the facility show that in the past
PWEC has not achieved the tasking goal and has suffered the consequences. The first challenge for the
new management teams is to determine the appropriate tasking percentage, which is necessary to motivate
change without overburdening the shop and driving it into the destructive modes described above.
The second challenge facing the managers is the construction of a productivity metric that provides an
accurate measurement of the capability of the shop. The management teams must differentiate between
'working smarter' and 'working harder'. Achieving a short-term productivity boost from 'working harder'
is not sustainable. If managers fail to recognize the difference, they will eventually drive the organization
into a burnout mode where productivity levels will drop. This must not be allowed to occur. Until the
information systems are improved to allow the collection and analysis of productivity data, a productivity
test should be developed in PWEC, which is used on an annual basis to determine the change. A
representative set of overhaul process steps should be chosen and a set of three to five individuals from
each job level run through them to determine the productivity of each group. Multiple people should be
used to normalize out the productivity differences between individuals.
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5 Manpower planning
The second major insight from this analysis regards how PWES and PWEC plan staffing. As mentioned in
the introduction, PWES is the major growth vehicle for Pratt right now and is in the process of growing
what was a $100M business in '92 into a $2B one by 2003. Though the company is not attempting to gain
all this growth through its existing businesses, the expectations for them are high. The lineA GM
indicated that his sales goals over the next few years require double-digit compound annual revenue
growth. Managing this growth in a labor intensive service industry is a challenge because the workforce
must be expanded and trained at a rate that can support it. From my interviews, I believe PWES and
PWEC are not formally acknowledging and accounting for this learning curve impact. The modeling
results also point out that the hiring delay, which exists due to a combination of Pratt's hiring policy and
FAA testing and certification requirements, significantly exacerbates the problem.
5.1 Source of learning curve
The learning curve that exists in PWEC is a result of the general complexity of the product, its associated
documentation and the PWEC infrastructure. The PWEC specific causes are the job shop organization of
the processes, the incredible manual information processing required of the workforce, and the lack of
formalized process training. There is no "standard work" in a station, so it takes experience to understand
what remains to be done when stepping into a process after someone which is a common occurrence in the
shop due to process interruptions and engine prioritization changes. The weak IT systems, as mentioned
above, place the majority of the information processing requirements onto the workforce, so one needs to
build a knowledge of what information is required to process a part and where that information resides.
Finally, the use of on-the-job-training (OJT) to convey process knowledge means there is wide variation in
the content and extent of the knowledge transfer that takes place during this early training.
5.1.1 Standard work
The lack of standard work is a function of the historical job shop manufacturing system of PWEC. The
shop was laid out as a series 'bays' where engines were brought for disassembly and assembly. This
structure was used because the exact nature and sequencing of the work required varied from engine to
engine, as it still does. A group of mechanics and inspectors worked on the complete teardown and
assembly of an engine, so there were not significant hand-off issues. In this environment, the workers
paced themselves and organized the sequencing of work, as they felt most comfortable. The workers liked
the flexibility.
The shop has migrated toward a 'flow-line' manufacturing system design over the last several years to gain
better control over WIP levels and turn around time. At the time of my research this change had only
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taken place in disassembly. In this migration, process steps have not been broken down significantly, so it
is still common to have full shift or multi-shift tasks.
Though the required FAA-approved documentation has always been followed for processes, there is no
'standard work sequence' in the facility. This is due to a combination of the difficulty of implementing it
with the work content permutations they have from engine to engine, the magnitude of work in each
station, and the desire of the workforce. In interviewing supervisors on the process flow, I discovered that
the preferred sequencing for a given set of assembly steps in what is considered a single process block, or
section, varies by shift and individual. This lack of structured sequencing makes it difficult for people to
effectively step in and take over processes. It takes an experienced mechanic to be able to walk into an
assembly bay and determine by looking at the combination of part racks, partially assembled engine
components and partially completed documentation where to start working. Analogous problems exist
with the inspection processes for the inspectors.
5.1.2 Material presentation system
A second component of the shop organization that contributes to the learning curve is the material
presentation system. As mentioned above, parts are only segregated to the engine section level on the
shelves of the material handling racks, and a section can consist of several hundred parts. To find a part
within that section requires manually searching the shelf which contains all those components. To do this
efficiently requires knowledge of what the part looks like. This is only gained through experience because
the documentation one has when searching seldom includes a picture of the part. This impacts both
inspectors and mechanics as they do their processes in the following ways. An inspector starts his process
by picking a part. His search process then involves finding the part number on the part, which he can then
use to search through the documentation to determine the inspection criteria. Finding the part number
location on a dirty tube can be a tedious process, so experience contributes to how efficiently these are
found. For the mechanic, the process order is reversed. He wants a specific part to complete an assembly.
For some types of parts this search can be unbearably difficult. The best example involves finding the
appropriate tubing from the myriad pieces stored on the external tubing rack to reassemble them in the
proper order on the engine. One supervisor told me that his experienced workers could perform this day
plus assembly operation two to three times faster than the inexperienced workers.
5.1.3 Information system
As mentioned above, the information systems are the Achilles' heel of PWEC. The systems are not -
structured to facilitate the work process by integrating and customizing the documentation for a given
engine, nor do they support on-line data collection. This results in the workforce having to manually
coordinate and manage a significant amount of data with the lion's share of this effort falling on the
inspectors. To show the magnitude of this processing effort on the part of the inspector, a simple
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explanation of the part inspection process follows. Three documents are generated which the inspector
uses on each engine:
" Modification Sheet (Mod sheets): This is a list of all the service bulletin upgrades that are to
be included in the engine during this overhaul. This reference is required to determine the
dispositioning of parts.
* Engine Inspection Report (EIR): The EIR is a comprehensive bill of materials for the engine
with all the part number variations since the engine first went into manufacturing. When a
part gets modified due a service bulletin, the part number is changed for accountability
reasons. The EIR references the original part number for a given part and the sequence of
part numbers that resulted from all the service bulletins that have impacted that part. The
inspector documents on the EIR which part in that modification sequence the engine has and
which one is required based on the Mod sheets.
" Record of Fits and Clearances (Fit sheets): This is the document that contains all the
measurements that need to be taken on parts and assembly interfaces. Some of these fits and
clearances will depend on the modification level of the engine.
When the inspector picks up a part, he needs to find it on the EIR to determine and document the
modification level the part is at. He then needs to cross-reference the mod sheet to determine whether the
part requires additional modification to incorporate a service bulletin requested by the customer. Finally,
he needs to check the fit sheets to determine whether a fit is required. To determine how to inspect a part
or where to take a given fit measurement on it, he must go to the foot-thick section of the Clean Inspection
and Repair manual (CIR) which contains that part and find the appropriate instructions. He then carries out
the inspection as defined. If the part requires repair or modification, he must find and read the service
bulletin to determine the changes required for the part. Once he understands this, he finds the proper repair
processing instruction template on a mainframe terminal, which he then customizes on the system, prints
out and includes with the documentation packet. There is a multitude of permutations to this process,
which I will not go into here. All of the information retrieval, with the exception of some service bulletins,
is done manually. Until the inspector develops a familiarity with the inspection processes, common service
bulletins and common repair procedures there is a significant amount of information search and processing
required.
5.1.4 Method used to convey process specific knowledge
The final source of the long learning curve is a lack of a formalized training program for conveying process
specific knowledge to new workers. There are training programs on how to inspect and follow the
documentation, but there is no formal mechanism for capturing and conveying best practices in the shop
(the tribal knowledge if you will) or identifying the most useful engine specific information. PWEC uses
on the job training (OJT) to achieve this. New employees are partnered with an experienced worker for
their first three months on the job. They learn by basically working through jobs with their mentor and
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asking questions. This method does not guarantee that a new worker learns the most relevant information,
i.e. common inspection processes and service bulletins, or the most efficient methods to perform a process.
It is impossible for someone to learn all of the information, but they can focus on a select set. Most of the
experienced workers had their own notebooks, which they had developed through experience that
contained this reference material. By not standardizing and conveying this reference material in a formal
way, the choice and structure of the knowledge transfer is left in the hands of the mentor, which creates a
wide distribution of learning experiences. This lack of a formal process extends the learning curve for the
organization.
OJT also impacts shop productivity in the short-term by focusing experienced workers on training. While
they are in training mode, they are not working as efficiently as when they are on their own. This
productivity derate of the experienced workforce was brought up as an issue by one of the supervisors in
the first Kaizen I attended. Obviously, the impact of this derate is a function of the size of the new
employee base relative to the experienced workforce base.
5.1.5 Historical evidence of learning curve
Historical evidence supports the existence of this learning curve. Both operations managers interviewed
indicated that the average hours per engine had shot up following the last workforce expansion and that it
had taken a couple of years for this reference to return to pre-expansion numbers. One of them made the
point that the increase in workforce experience was the major source of the productivity gain that had
occurred over the last several years.
5.2 Learning curve perception gap
From what I gathered in my six months in the facility, there is little acknowledgement of the learning
curve. Within PWEC management, there is awareness to it, but it is not quantified or included in the
staffing policies. In PWES there is little awareness and less consideration.
5.2.1 PWES perception
The perception in PWES is that overhaul is just another permutation of a manufacturing environment with
the same capability requirements of its workforce that exist on the OEM side with engine final assembly.
They believe that whatever problems exists are a function of the manufacturing system design and that
once the system is transformed into a lean manufacturing environment, similar to what OEM is now, these
problems will be eliminated.
While I don't disagree that a large portion of the learning curve is due to the system structure, I was amazed
at the magnitude of the perception gap that existed between PWES and the PWEC workforce with regard to
the learning curve. In the kickoff kaizen to start the manufacturing system redesign, the instructor from
page# 46
PWES made a comment that it should take no more than a week for an in-experienced worker to learn the
processes in a station once standard work is in place. One of the experienced supervisors responded, "it
takes 3 years to train mechanics to get up to speed (some guys are faster)" here. This supervisor works on
the oldest engine in the facility, which is the most difficult to repair, but his comments are not significantly
out of line for the rest of the facility. The instructor responded to this by simply reiterating his belief that it
shouldn't take more than a couple of times through a process to understand it and become reasonably
proficient.
5.2.2 PWEC vs. OEM manufacturing
Even with the lean manufacturing improvements, processes will never be as straight forward as in OEM
assembly. The work content will always vary in overhaul. The workforce will always be required to
understand the history of the design changes for a given engine design to determine what changes are
required to modify an engine from one service bulletin level to another. The information processing
challenges will, thus, always be significantly greater than OEM assembly. OEM assembly is always
building the most recent version of the design, so their processes are inherently standardized.
5.3 Method for staffing revisited
Though management in PWEC knows that a learning curve exists, it is not explicitly captured or quantified
in any of their staffing policies. I think it is important to return to PWEC's workforce planning
methodology here because I think the exclusion of the learning curve will be a major problem for them as
they go through their growth phase.
5.3.1 Annual manpower planning process
PWEC presently does not acknowledge their workforce skill distribution in their aggregate planning
process nor detail out the productivity degradation that takes place within the experienced workforce due to
OJT. Staffing levels are determined by calculating the average man-hours of work required for each month
sales projections for the future year and dividing this by a generic worker's availability for each month of X
hours. All of the miscellaneous sources of time loss are captured in the generic workers monthly
availability, so it includes vacation time, the required 10% overtime and all forms of training. For months
that are shorter or have major holidays, the available hours is lower. The staffing level for the year is
simply the average of the staffing requirements for the twelve months. If the organization is adding new
people, the training fraction will be increased to incorporate both the time spent in formal training classes
by the new employees and an estimate of the experienced workers' time lost to OJT. My complaint with
this methodology is that it does not properly reflect the productivity distribution of the experienced
workforce that is beyond the initial formal training but not yet up to speed. In an organization going
through a growth spurt, this method will overestimate the organization's true capacity.
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5.3.2 Hiring process
The planning process takes place in October for the subsequent year. Once the staffing expectations are
determined, the PWEC human resources (HR) department works to begin identifying potential recruits.
People are screened and informed a position should be available for them at the start of year. They cannot
actually start anyone through the hiring process though until January 1 S. On January 1 they begin this
process. According to the human resources coordinator, there is a fixed set of drug and certification
testing required of all applicants due to the combined Pratt and FAA requirements. This testing is most
severe for the inspectors. According to the HR coordinator, a new employee will begin working about five
weeks after they have started through the process. This timeframe was supported by one of the operations
managers, who stated that during the last growth spurt,
"People started arriving in groups of 3 at about 4 -6 weeks. The last ones didn't arrive until the
six-month point. Delays were the result of larger Pratt issues. We would get people lined up to
hire only to lose them to a hiring freeze. When the freeze was removed, we would be forced to
start over because they had taken other jobs."15
Other individuals supported this perspective in the facility. In the simulation model which will be
explained below, I have assumed an average hiring delay of 2 months which is slightly longer than the
average quoted by the HR coordinator to account for the time lag that occurs in bringing people in after
they have been approved.
5.4 Simulation model structure
To test this theory, a system dynamics simulation model of the engine overhaul business was developed.
The model incorporates the major operational components of the business and the operational policies that
are used to manage it to simulate the shop's performance. The model was designed to reflect how the
system behaves given its structure. Simplifications have been made to keep the model size manageable
while still capturing the important dynamics. The model is not intended as a 'perfect' replica of the
business. The major sources of variation that were left out are: engine type, job type and customer
requirement (contractual TAT requirements vary by customer). Though there is value in understanding how
these issues interact to affect shop performance, capturing this complexity requires a far greater
undertaking then was feasible within this project. To most accurately reflect how lineA would perform,
an idealized demand stream of the highest volume demand combination (engine model / overhaul category
/ TAT performance requirement), which lineA sees, was used. At a macro level the model is structured as
shown in Figure 5-1.
" Conversation with operations manager of lineB and line_C
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INPUTS PERFORMANCE METRICS
- Work content breakdown
- Workforce productivity dist. 
- Turn around time
- Manpower planning meth. SIMULATION 
- Customer delivery performance
- Overhaul process schedule MODEL * Overhaul costs
- Rotable pool inventory plan 
- Quality
- Resource management
Figure 5-1: Simulation model overview
5.4.1 Inputs and outputs explained
Of the important customer metrics mentioned earlier in the paper, the model was designed to generate
turnaround time (TAT) and customer delivery performance. These metrics were focused on for two
reasons. First, the foundation of the model is a simulator of the physical processes of the shop and these
metrics are most directly related to that foundation. The workforce and their processing of the engines had
to be built before anything else could be added to the model. Second, TAT improvement is a major focus
effort in PWES. Understanding the impact of the staffing policy on TAT is, thus, an area of great interest
to management. I did not have time to collect enough information to accurately capture the cost
components in the model or properly reflect how the shop's performance impacts quality.
On the input side the model reflects as accurately as possible how the shop is structured and run. To
explain the inputs in the order listed above.
* Work content breakdown: The work content of the overhaul process has been aggregated into several
macro level steps, i.e. engine disassembly. The amount of work, measured in man-hours, allocated to
each step is based on data from previous years for this engine type /job category. This is the same
data that the operation manager uses to plan staffing and allocate the workforce between the processes.
Only the inspector and mechanic workforces are included in the model because they are the two major
groups directly involved in the overhaul process.
e Workforce productivity distribution: Based on interviews with the operations managers, the workforce
was split into five productivity categories that mirror the job levels in the shop: levels 1, 2, 4 and 6.
Workers start as level 6s and migrate up. The level 6's were split into two productivity groups: new-
hires and experienced, because they are being trained during the new-hire time period. Level l's are
the process leads. There are only twelve level 1 positions. The productivity levels for each group
were referenced to an average experienced worker who is a level 2. The workforce is modeled as an
aging chain, where workers start as level 6 new-hires and migrate through the chain as they gain
experience eventually retiring out the experienced end from level 1 or 2 (see the Appendix for a more
detailed explanation of model structure). The numbers used in the model for each grouping are from
the actual workforce grade level distribution by job category: inspector or mechanic.
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* Manpower planning methodology: The manpower planning methodology used was the one described
above. This sets the desired workforce level when the model starts. If the workforce is below the
desired level, hiring starts. The hiring rate used is based on the same operation manager interviews.
e Overhaul process schedule: As mentioned above, each engine is treated as a mini project. There is a
standard schedule for when this engine model should begin and complete different stages of the
process. The schedule used in the simulation model is derived from this, though it varies in two
regards. First, the model assumes weekends do not exist, so the schedule is compressed. Second, the
model does not allow processes to overlap as happens in reality, so the schedules have been modified
to handle this approximation based on interviews with the production scheduler. I will clarify this
point with an example. Engine assembly takes 25 days'6 from start to finish, the modules are required
for this assembly at different points in time: HPC at day 1, HPT at day 5, LPC at day 8 and LPT at day
10. The model has only one aggregated module, so the engine assembly schedule has been modified to
18 days with the aggregated module required to start engine assembly. This is most significant
approximation made to enable the construction of the model.
* Rotable pool inventory planning: The rotable pool has been approximated in two ways. First, the wide
variety of parts carried in the pool has been aggregated into three groups. The aggregation was based
on the relative size of a part's allowed repair window vs. the vendor's TAT commitment for that part.
The TAT for a given group was calculated as the average window for that part population weighted by
the dollar value of each part. Second, the quantity of each group carried by PWEC is based on
interviews with the same production scheduler who also is responsible for managing the rotable pool.
Rotable pool tasking is not formally built into the model, but included through the production
scheduler's estimation of how much material he would be allowed to carry. This grouping is the
second most significant approximation made.
* Resource management: This refers specifically to workforce management. The model assumes that
every engine uses the rotable pool for all three-part groups, so rotable pool usage is always on. The
workforce is allocated to disassembly and assembly tasks based on the relative schedule status of the
engines in the shop. Engines in assembly are given priority over engines in disassembly because the
shop will do everything in its power to get an engine out on schedule. The model has been designed
with a minimum time constraint on each process to prevent infeasible parallel processing, or to restate
in layman's term prevent "the maturation of a baby with 9 women in one month case".
5.4.2 Process structure of model
As mentioned in the work content breakdown section above, the process was modeled as a series of macro
level steps. The process structure used for the model is shown in Figure 5-2 for disassembly tasks and
Figure 5-3 for assembly tasks. This is a continuous time model, so engines flow incrementally in units of
engines/day from process to process as the work is done. This is in comparison to a discrete time model
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where an engine would have to be completed in entirety at a process before it could be moved to the next
step. The continuous approximation I believe is better, and actually counteracts the shortcomings of the
aggregation of processes, because it more accurately reflects how the shop works. In the disassembly area,
parts are inspected at BX and sent out for repair as they are removed from the engine by the mechanics.
They do not queue up until the entire engine is disassembled before the inspectors begin. At the split and
union of the processes in the model, flow rate is conserved. This means that engines enter the engine BX
and module disassembly queues at the rate at which they are being disassembled by engine mechanics.
Engines enter the awaiting engine assembly queue at the lowest processing rate of module assembly
inspection and engine parts being repaired.
DISASSEMBLY TASKS
To module
assembly
To engine
assembly
Engines
Arriving -
(engines/day)
disassembling inspecting
and splitting parts
engines (BX)
Figure 5-2: Disassembly tasks approximation for simulation model
ASSEMBLY TASKS
Module
inspectors
inspecting
modules
(LX)
assembling inspecting (fixed time dressing QEC
engines engines to test)
(LX)
Figure 5-3: Assembly tasks approximation for simulation model
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Shipping
(engines/day)
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16 The numbers used have been falsified to protect proprietary information.
5.4.3 Simulation model setup and caveats
The simulation model was run for one year assuming an XX% demand increase over existing '98 sales.
The demand was distributed through the year based on the average annual demand profiles of the last three
years. At the start of the model run, the shop begins its hiring process to reach its projected staffing level
based on the demand increase. It is important to note four things in reviewing these results. First, there is
NO productivity improvement built into the model, so the worker's productivity does not improve during
the year run but is frozen at last year's level. Second, the demand profile used has three peak periods in it:
one at the beginning of the year, one before the halfway point and one at three-quarters (Figure 5-4).
X engines
Peak 1 -. ,Peak 2 ,-Peak 3
0 engines
TIME
Figure 5-4: Simulation model demand profile
Third, the model does not capture the damaging effect of workarounds as shown in the causal loops in
Chapter 4 because I did not have time to quantify how the workload in CX increased as a function of the
backlog. This is a shortcoming in the model, which underestimates the destructive effects of the bay
concept operational philosophy. Fourth, the model was setup to start in equilibrium for the projected
demand which equates to every process in the shop being loaded exactly to FULL capacity at the new
demand level. This assumption is a poor one because shop demand tails off approaching the holiday
season. It is partially driving the pessimistic results that will be shown.
5.4.4 Output used in analyzing learning curve
TAT performance is the only type of output that will be shown in this section of the thesis. The X-axes of
the curves represents time, in days. The Y-axes of the curves represent the average TAT performance of
the engines leaving the facility on a given day of the year. The reference TAT shown on the graph is the
scheduled time at which an engine should be completed based on the '98 engine overhaul schedule.
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5.5 Simulation model results
The model results show that the staffing policies presently in place are not properly designed to handle the
effect of the learning curve during a growth phase. The shop, first, does not hire enough people and,
second, does not hire them fast enough to build the productive capacity required to support the increased
demand in the early stages of growth. This results in the shop failing to meet its TAT performance
objective for much of the year. Once a backlog develops, the shop is not able to work it off under this
demand scenario. Figure 5-5 shows this result along with two other cases that were run to bound the
system's performance for reference. The three cases are:
e CASE 1: Hiring delay, learning curve: This is the reality case that reflects how the shop is run. All the
new-hires do not arrive on day one, and they do not know what they are doing when they arrive. Also,
the experienced workers' productivity drops in the short term as people commit their time to OJT.
e CASE 2: Instant hiring, same productivity: This is the ideal case scenario. All the new-hires do arrive
on day one, and they know what are they doing. As can be seen from the graph, the shop is easily able
to handle this increased demand. The TAT does not decrease below reference because the model
incorporates pacing, which means that workers pace themselves based on their schedule backlog.
" CASE 3: No additional people: This is the worst case scenario. The shop gets no additional people, so
it never gains the productive capacity required to support the new demand. As can be seen from the
graph, once the shop falls behind, its performance just continues to degrade because it never has the
capacity to work off the backlog. NOTE: This case has no resource diversion for training.
XX day
- Case 1
-- Case 2
...... Case 3
reference - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -
X day,
TIME
Figure 5-5: TAT performance as a function of time, XX% demand increase
I have chosen these two boundary cases to show how the staffing policies are impacting the productivity of
the shop. Case 3 was chosen to show that the shop does not gain much initial benefit from the new hires.
Case 3's performance is actually competitive with Case 1 for the first third of the year because the shop is
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busy training and the new-hires are not that productive yet. It is only after those first new-hires have
matured that the shop has built enough productive capacity to work off the backlog which results from the
demand spike that occurs just before mid-year. Case 2 was chosen to indicate how the shop would perform
if there were neither a hiring delay nor a learning curve.
I think Case 2 is an important reference case because it reflects the 'mental model' many have of how the
shop should be performing. The assumption that underlies this mental model is that you hire people, they
come in and are productive right away. What the model points out is that there are significant time delays
in the productivity rise resulting from the learning curve and hiring delay. I believe it is the Case 2 mental
model that PWES is holding the businesses to. As can be seen, the 'real' performance case, Case 1, falls
far short of this ideal case. When this graph was shown to managers of PWEC line A, there was strong
agreement that the 'real' case reflected how the shop would actually behave under these demand
assumptions.
5.5.1 Sensitivity analysis
Many of the numbers that have been used to build this model, such as the workforce productivity and hiring
delay numbers, were estimated in interviews with the operations manager of the line. Estimates were used
in lieu of real data for these variables for two reasons: the information system does not support this type of
information query on historical data, and the manual collection of this information would have been a
gargantuan task. The stories from the operations managers' experience provide very compelling, though
not analytical, support for these assumptions. Since the numbers are not based on hard data, in this section
the system's sensitivity to these approximations will be analyzed. For those estimates that the system is
most sensitive to, more research should be done to determine better approximations. It is important to note
that in all the cases to follow, the reference case will always be the 'real' case from above, and it will
always be the red curve.
5.5.1.1 Hiring delay
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2 month delay
-- 1 day delay
reference
X day,
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Figure 5-6: Impact of hiring delay on TAT performance, same demand profile
The system's sensitivity to the hiring delay was the first assumption tested. As can be seen from Figure 5-
6, the estimate used for hiring delay has a significant impact on the shop's performance. If the shop is able
to bring everyone in on day one, the performance is significantly better than when they trickle in over the
initial months. I was unable to get data to support the conjectural input of the operations manager;
however, I believe the delay assumption is reasonable given the HR coordinator's statement that it takes
five to six weeks on average to process new employees. The delay used is only slightly larger than this
number, so I believe it is a valid assumption. This is an estimate that needs to better quantified. It is
important to note that even getting all the people in on day one does not prevent the shop from falling short
of its performance goals during the year. The new-hires still take time to be trained, and there is a large
short-term productivity drop in the experienced workforce due to the concentration of new-hires. The shop
is unable to prevent the backlog from developing near mid-year. The new workers, though, do gain enough
experience by then to bring the shop performance into line once the demand spike dissipates.
5.5.1.2 Learning curve
page # 55
- Ref case:
full learning curve
-- Learning time
ree c Areduced 50%reference
....... Productivity gap
reduced 50%
X day 0
TIME
Figure 5-7: Impact of learning curve on TAT performance, same demand profile
The second assumption investigated was the learning curve. There are two components to the learning
curve: the time a worker spends in a productivity level, and the productivity of that level. Cases were
developed to test the system's sensitivity to the estimates used for both. The cases were setup as follows:
e CASE 1: reference case with full learning curve. This is the standard against which all this analysis is
done.
" CASE 2: learning time reduced 50%. The model was reconfigured so a worker took half as long to
advance through the inexperienced levels, 6 and 4. For example, a level 6 new-hires spent only six
weeks in training vs. three months in the reference case.
" CASE 3: productivity gap reduced 50%. The model was reconfigured with the productivity difference
between the inexperienced workers, level 6 and 4, and the experienced workers, level 2, being reduced
by half. For example, the new average productivity for a level 6 new-hire is 65% of a level 2's
capability vs. 40% in the reference case.
As can be seen in Figure 5-7, the system is very sensitive to the learning curve assumptions made with the
productivity assumption being the most significant. The productivity assumption has the greatest impact
because 30% of the workforce is inexperienced on lineA. Increasing the average productivity of this
segment significantly increases the overall productive capacity. These assumptions are the most significant
ones in the model. I believe the time approximations used are reasonable because they map to the workers
job level classifications, which are performance based. I believe the productivity approximations are
reasonable from the discussions with the operations managers, however, these should be further researched
to more accurately reflect the learning curve of the shop.
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5.5.1.3 On the Job Training (OJT)
XX day
Ref case:
OJT no change
- - OJT reduced 40%
referene
X day=
TIME
Figure 5-8: Impact of OJT on TAT, same demand profile
The OJT percentage that was used in the reference case was originally generated in the interview with one
of the operations managers. The number generated then, I believe, made sense because of the concern I
had heard from people in the shop about the productivity drop that takes place when they have to train.
For example, the supervisor who I quoted above on the learning curve, was emphasizing the training
impact as much as the learning curve in his comments. When I circulated the number I was planning to
use among the shop, there was concern that the rate was too high. Regardless of whether this is true,
Figure 5-8 shows that the OJT level does not significantly impact the shop's overall productivity at the
level of hiring required for the model. As mentioned above, the magnitude of this productivity derate is
going to be a function of the size of the new-hire workforce relative to the experienced workforce.
5.5.1.4 Ramp up in demand profile ('98 to '99)
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the model was run assuming an XX% increase in the demand
over '98's sales. The reference case was run assuming a step function change in demand occurs on Jan 1
from the '98 sales level to that projected for '99. The reality is the slope is more gradual. To determine the
impact this assumption had on the performance, the following demand profile cases were run.
* CASE 1: reference case as above.
* CASE 2: 2 month sales ramp. Sales take two months to ramp up to the profile for the new volume.
* CASE 3: full year sales ramp. The sales level ramps for the entire year.
Figure 5-9 shows the different demand profiles run. As can be seen, the differences in the profiles for this
sales volume increase are only visible during the first two demand oscillations.
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0
0 engines
TIME
Figure 5-9: Demand profile ramps
Figure 5-10 shows that the step change from the '98 to '99 profiles is a reasonable one, at least for this
level of volume increase. In all three cases, the shop is required to process the same number of engines, so
the total work content required for the year is the same. The benefit of shifting the workload toward the
later part of the year does improve the shop's performance, but only minimally. A backlog still develops in
the shop, which it is never able to work off. Also, shifting the work only increases the amount of work
required to process near the end of the year.
- Case 1
- - Case 2
....... Case 3
TIME
Figure 5-10: Impact of demand profile on TAT
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5.6 Conclusions on manpower planning
In conclusion, I believe that the model accurately shows that the staffing policies presently in place do not
properly reflect the capabilities of the shop. The present system does not account for the learning curve of
the organization or the lag that occurs in the hiring after the start of the year. These policies combine to
overstate the shop's productive capacity through the year.
5.6.1 Learning in a growth phase
The present staffing policies actually compound the problem during a growth phase. In a prolonged period
of growth, which PWEC lineA is now in, the workforce distribution shifts toward the inexperienced
levels, so the extent to which the capability is overstated grows.
To return to the issue of tasking, I think the policy needs to be very carefully moderated in this organization
during growth because of the learning curve and use of OJT. The average productivity of the organization
actually goes down with hiring because the new people are inexperienced and the shop is focusing its
energy on training to get them up to speed. Depending on the extent of hiring, the shop has even fewer
experienced resources to invest in improvement. Tasking only makes this effort harder.
5.6.2 Staffing policy recommendations
There are two things that PWEC needs to do to improve their performance with the learning curve. The
first is redesign the staffing methodology to properly reflect the productivity distribution that exists within
the workforce. The present system does not capture the differences in productivity between the levels. All
are assumed to have a uniform capacity of X hours per month. This overstates the productive capacity of
the shop when the workforce is skewed toward the inexperienced levels, and it also overstates the
contribution that will be made by new-hires when they are first brought on. In the past the shop has
suffered for not doing this. One operations supervisor stated that after the last growth spurt, the shop really
struggled trying to meet its demand because the workforce was just too inexperienced.
I recommend that the staffing methodology be redesigned as follows:
1. Split the workforce into buckets by job level (6, 4, 2, 1)
2. Assign a nominal productivity to each group in man-hours / month. For example, If a level 2 has a
productive capacity of 100 hours / month, than a level 4 has a productive capacity of 80 hours / month.
3. Using the workforce and productivity distribution from the previous year, determine the 'productive
man-hours' that were required / engine. This is critical for doing the forward planning.
4. Based on the sales projections for the upcoming year, determine the required 'productive man-hours'
required for the shop by month.
5. Determine the productivity improvement that is going to occur over the next year for each bucket of
workers by month.
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6. Calculate the required workforce increase (incorporating the timing and level at which the new-hires
will come in at and the OJT derate which will occur) required by month to support this sales effort.
7. Make a management level decision how to handle periods of overstaffmg and shortfalls.
Second, the hiring policy must be changed so the delay is eliminated and the hiring actually leads the sales
growth. In an organization with a learning curve, this is the only way that the shop is guaranteed of having
the productive capacity needed to meet the demand. The amount the hiring must lead the growth is a
function of the learning curve. PWEC and PWES management are very reluctant to have hiring lead sales.
5.6.3 Going forward
5.6.3.1 Improvement efforts underway
As with the tasking issue, the new management teams of PWES and PWEC are working on correcting
these issues. Some of the efforts underway are:
= Hiring delay: They are working to reduce the hiring delay through efforts such as hiring pre-certified
mechanics and inspectors with experience in other overhaul facilities.
- Learning curve: To deal with the impact of the learning curve, the efforts are indirect. As mentioned
above, much of the learning curve is due to the present structure of the shop: the lack of standard work
processes, the lack of a piece part material presentation and the poor IT infrastructure. The
improvement efforts that are being focused on correcting these problems will have the dual benefit of
raising the overall productivity of the shop and reducing the learning curve. Reducing the learning
impact will make the business much more responsive and reduce the need to lead the hiring in front of
the rise in demand, something that PWES is very reluctant to do.
- Combining job categories: The learning curve impact will also be reduced by the plan to collapse the
job categories of mechanics and inspectors. This effort will help in two ways. First, it will eliminate a
lot of the delays that occur at handoff, which increases productivity. It will also eliminate the resource
constraints that cause many of the delays. Right now CX only draws from the inspector resource base.
When this group becomes saturated, their backlog affects the whole shop. With a collapse of the
categories, 'mechanics' can be re-allocated to this process to rebalance the workforce. Obviously,
these temporary workers won't be as efficient in the short-term, but it does reduce the bottleneck.
5.6.3.2 Management lesson on learning curve
The lesson from this analysis is that managers need to be sensitive to the learning curve and hiring delays
that exist within an organization if they intend to always achieve their required TAT performance during
growth phases. To do this they must build the productive capacity required either through timed
productivity improvement gains, which offsets the temporary shortfall due to learning, or advance hiring.
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6 Manufacturing system design
The intent of this section is to first explain PWEC's structure, physical and managerial, that has developed
as a result of the demand variability it experiences, and then to discuss the implications of the transition that
is taking place in the manufacturing system design. As mentioned earlier, the shop is subject to significant
demand variability both on a daily and seasonal basis. This resulted in the shop adopting the simplest
manufacturing system design, a job shop. It also led to the treatment of each engine as a stand-alone
project. This single engine focus causes the shop to make near term decisions that deleteriously impact
long-term performance. The dynamic that causes this behavior will be explained. There is a major push in
PWES to transition PWEC to a lean manufacturing system design, a flow-line. There is significant concern
in PWEC over the capability of this system, though, given the variability they experience. I have modified
the model to represent a flow-line design. The results of that comparative analysis will be discussed here
and attempts made to answer those concerns.
6.1 Flexibility ofpresent manufacturing system
PWEC's modified bay concept manufacturing system design, which consists of a few dedicated process
areas and a large series of engine bays, was chosen because of the perceived flexibility benefits it provides.
This section will give a historical view on how the shop was run. This is no longer exactly representative
of how PWEC lineA's area is operated, but I think it is relevant for this discussion because the beliefs
regarding the benefits of a bay concept are still widely held in the area and the facility as a whole.
6.1.1 Demand variability
Demand variability is a significant issue in PWEC's business. As shown in Chapter 2, the shop is subject
to both daily and seasonal demand variation. In this environment, the bay design was believed to be the
most attractive because it allowed engines to exist at all stages of the overhaul process independently. As
long as there was capacity in the shop, which was interpreted as empty bays, additional engines could be
started. The system was, thus, flexible because it could absorb demand spikes as they occur. Manpower
was allocated to engines based on availability. When manpower was a constraint, as often occurred,
engines were prioritized based on the following three criteria: projected shipping schedules, importance of
customer and part availability. If the shop was significantly backlogged, it was not uncommon for an
engine to sit with only minimal work until it finally reached priority status, i.e. it was far enough behind
schedule to be noticed.
If resources were available and a bay open, engines would be inducted as soon as possible. The accepted
belief within the shop was that there was significant value in starting an engine through the process. I think
the motivation for this mentality was two-fold. First, it made the customer happy to see the engine in
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process. Second, I think it made PWEC happy because they felt uncomfortable having engines sit outside
with the TAT clock running.
6.1.2 Flow interruptions
The second major perceived benefit of the bay concept is that it provides infinite flexibility with regard to
process interruptions. There are numerous points during the process where interruptions occur because of
either a lack of information, need for customer feedback, or missing part. Some examples are as follows:
During the initial teardown and inspection, any unexpected problems that could require additional
work have to be approved by the customer. The shop is forced to wait for approval before continuing.
* Inspectors often find part damage, which is not covered in the inspection manual. They require
engineering support in some form to make a disposition decision. The delay in receiving this decision
is a function of where in the engineering organization the decision needs to be made, and that group's
backlog.
e Finally, it is quite common for repair vendors to fail to deliver parts on time to PWEC, which
interrupts assembly. Assembly processes are often started without the full complement of parts to stay
on schedule. If the required parts do not show up, the process stalls.
When an interruption occurs, the workforce is simply reallocated to the next job down the line. Their time
is, therefore, not wasted waiting for the interruption to be solved. There is a major emphasis in the shop on
maximizing workforce utilization. Interruptions are a significant issue in their processes.
6.1.3 Emphasis on single engine
The lack of a sequenced process flow gives rise to the need to track engines on their own individual
schedules. With engines scattered through the shop in all stages of overhaul, it is impossible to determine
where an engine is in time relative to the customer TAT commitment. When resource constraints occur,
because the system is so flexible, the schedule has become the major mechanism used for prioritizing
resources. Because the shop is chronically understaffed, prioritization is a way of life.
6.2 Bay concept shortcomings
The shortcomings of this manufacturing system are significant. First, it de-emphasizes process stability,
i.e. keeping all the engines moving through the process, over workforce utilization. Second, it de-
emphasizes process efficiency and creates secondary constraints. Finally, it fosters a destructive fire
fighting mentality.
6.2.1 Workforce utilization over process stability
As a result of the flexibility of the bay concept, workforce utilization has risen above process stability in
importance within PWEC. When an interruption occurs, the workforce is quickly reallocated to a different
process. The impact on the mechanics and inspectors is that they lose their rhythm on a job so their
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productivity drops. On each new job there is a mini learning curve that occurs in figuring out what has
been done and what work remains. One supervisor stated that workers can be reallocated no more than
twice in a day before the day becomes a waste. The impact on the support organization is a dilution of
focus. Often these transition jobs are not completely setup. The support organization had not planned on
them be worked on at that time, so the shift requires the support organization to scramble. These resources
suffer, therefore, a similar productivity drop due to the need to refocus. With the workforce constantly
changing focus, the search for the source of the interruption often gets ignored or dropped. It is not
uncommon for an interruption to be left unresolved until that engine rises significantly in the priority list to
ensure that support resources are dedicated to its correction.
6.2.2 Process efficiency and secondary constraints
The second major shortcoming with this design is that it de-emphasizes process efficiency and allows
secondary constraints to occur. With engines unevenly distributed throughout the process, it is not
uncommon for resources to be allocated to jobs at which they are not efficient. A supervisor indicated that
he had one mechanic who could mount a portion of the fan assembly faster than anyone else on his staff by
a factor of two. The bay concept does not allow this individual to be dedicated to this process. It is also
not uncommon for multiple engines to require the same piece of tooling concurrently. When this occurs,
the process on one engine is delayed until the tooling becomes available. During this time attempts are
made to reallocate the workers. With all this dynamic resource allocation taking place, the source of the
secondary constraints continually changes.
6.2.3 Fire fighting
The final major shortcoming and the one I consider the most significant is the fire-fighting mentality that
consumes the shop as a result of this flexibility. Every engine is treated as a stand-alone project and all
efforts are expended in attempting to get each engine out on schedule. This mentality is a result of the
desire to please the customer and the emphasis PWES places on TAT and customer delivery performance.
The line manager must answer to any delivery failures to PWES management, so there is a significant
incentive to attempt to prevent an engine from missing its ship date. The result of this assembly skewed
prioritization process is that the schedule for engines early in the process is often sacrificed in an attempt to
save engines closest to shipping. This dynamic is shown in the causal loop of Figure 6-1 for the case of a
delay caused by a part shortage.
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Figure 6-1: Fire-fighting loop as a result of delays, modified Figure 4-5
This reinforcing loop starts with workers being pulled from disassembly to assembly to help get engines
out on time. This results in their disassembly tasks falling behind schedule. These disassembled engines
then enter the repair window late, requiring the marshalling organization to attempt to bring them back on
schedule through buys and swaps. When this is unsuccessful, as is often the case, the engine enters
assembly behind schedule creating the need for fire fighting to continue. Once this fire-fighting dynamic
establishes itself with the shop near capacity, it will not dissipate until resources are freed to bring early
processes back on schedule. This is such a powerful dynamic in the shop that they practically live in fire
fighting mode for large portions of the year. It also reinforces the earlier destructive dynamics that
negatively impact performance through increased workaround work and reduced cost effectiveness. It is
safe to say that fire fighting is bad.
6.3 Analysis of competing system designs
To increase productivity and reduce engine TAT, PWES is pushing PWEC to redesign its manufacturing
system into a lean manufacturing 'flow-line', as exists in original manufacturing.
6.3.1 PWEC concern with flow-line design and demand variability
While no one in the facility challenges the inherent process benefits of the lean manufacturing concepts,
such as standard work and better material presentation systems, they do question the efficacy of shifting
their system from the bay concept to a linear line. There is the belief that a flow-line is less flexible, and,
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therefore, unable to handle demand variability. As the thinking goes, a flow-line does not have the
flexibility to compensate for the demand variability, so the shop will be less effective at meeting its
delivery schedules with the flow-line than it presently is with the bay concept.
6.3.2 Simulation model modification
To test this theory, a modified version of the simulation model was built to reflect a flow-line design with
its associated management policies. The two models were then analyzed to determine their relative
sensitivity to demand variability. It is important to note that both models used the exact same learning
curve and hiring delay assumptions as those discussed above. When the model was built, the concepts for
the flow-line were still in their infancy, so the number of stations per macro process step was estimated
based on total work content and desired throughput.
The major difference between the system designs lies in their manpower management policies. In the bay
concept, schedule is king. Engines in final assembly are given priority over engines earlier in the process.
When a resource constraint develops, the fire-fighting dynamic described above is initiated. In the bay
model, resources are allocated to the assembly tasks first and then to upstream tasks based on availability.
There is a maximum allocation constraint on a process step, but there is no minimum one. In a resource
crunch, the upstream tasks get basically starved for resources until the downstream processes free up
resources by completing engines. In the flow-line concept, process flow is king. The goal is to keep all the
engines in the process moving at some minimum rate. In the flow model, resources are still allocated based
on relative schedule pressure, however, there is a minimum amount of capacity that must be allocated to
each process step to insure that the engines in those stations move forward at a minimum pace. The
priority for whatever excess capacity exists above this minimum required level is still given to assembly
first. However, unlike in the bay concept design, upstream processes are never resource starved.
There is one major shortcoming in this analysis which must be pointed out prior to showing the results:
process interruptions are NOT reflected in either model. This is less of an issue for the bay concept
because the system is designed around the flexible reallocation of the workforce. As long as there are
engines to be worked on, labor time is not 'lost'. This is, though, a significant issue with a traditional flow
line design where the 'flow' basically will stop with workers idled until the problem is rectified. . Until
these are worked out, the interruptions will definitely hinder the flow-line design. However, the shop is
planning to deal with this in the short term by pulling stalled engines out of the line so the interruption does
not cause the process to back up. Interruptions were not incorporated because I could not quantify the
magnitude of the different sources.
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6.3.3 Manufacturing system comparison results
The results from the analysis were surprising to many people. In contrast to the expectation, the flow line
TAT performance was comparable to that of the existing bay concept. Figure 6-2 below shows the TAT
schedule delay (difference between schedule and resulting TAT at shipping) which results for the two line
designs given the demand conditions, which have been used throughout this thesis.
XX days
-Ref case:
bay design
- - Flow-line design
0 days
TIME
Figure 6-2: TAT performance: competing manufacturing system designs
Because of the different policies in place for the flow-line, its TAT schedule delay leads that of the bay
concept. When the demand of the shop increases, as it does at the beginning of the year in this case, its
TAT performance suffers first because the policy requires that the entire shop carry the burden. The flow-
line does not allow the front of the process to be starved. The perceived benefits, thus, of the bay concept
being able to absorb demand spikes are illusory. Though the engines may enter the shop sooner under the
bay design, they will not leave the shop any sooner. Simply because they are in the building and being
worked on provides no benefit if the shop is overloaded.
Though the TAT performance of the two systems appears comparable, the flow-line actually performs
better over the long-term. As can be seen in Figure 6-3, the cumulative delay that develops over the year
under the flow-line design is less than that under the bay concept.
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Figure 6-3: Cumulative days late: competing manufacturing system designs
The superior performance of the flow line is due to the manpower management emphasis on process flow
over schedule. Even in this model, which does not capture all the detrimental secondary effects of fire
fighting, the deleterious impact of sacrificing the process to achieve short-term schedule needs is obvious.
I believe this is very powerful evidence of what the proper long-term solution should be because these
models assume exactly the same workforce productivity and demand streams. Arguably the results should
be exactly the same because the inputs are exactly the same. The difference in performance, thus, is solely
a function of the operational policy controlling them. Once the process interruptions are overcome, the
productivity improvements, which should come with the flow-line implementation, will dramatically
increase this gap.
6.4 Manufacturing system design conclusions
In conclusion, I believe the migration to a flow-line is the right direction for PWEC for two reasons. First,
the move will require a change in the focus from workforce utilization to process stability, which in the
long run will make the shop more productive because the process interruptions will be dramatically
reduced. Second, the move will shift the operational philosophy from being schedule driven to process
driven, which will also increase productivity.
6.4.1 Process stability
The first benefit of the flow-line design is that it will force the organization to emphasize process stability
over workforce utilization. In the classic lean manufacturing mindset, this shift will "lower the water, to
show the rocks". Process interruptions, both internally and externally generated, are a major source of
frustration for the shop. By moving to a flow-line, the shop is going to be forced to root cause and work to
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eradicate these process interruptions. Over the long run this will definitely increase the productivity of the
shop because it will eliminate the constant resetting that goes on as workers are reallocated from job to job.
It is important for both PWEC and PWES to understand that in the short-term, though, this is going to be a
very painful process. There is going to be a decrease in short-term productivity as the shop begins to
address these problems. It takes more time to root cause a problem than to find a quick answer that allows
the work to continue. Resources are, thus, going to be less 'productive' at getting the process working
again in the short-term. PWEC engineers spending their time on root causing why it takes engineering in
East Hartford X days to respond to a problem, are not working on finding the answer to those problems
quickly.
The productivity hit will only be exacerbated if the organization were to adopt a strict 'flow-line' design
because suddenly all the problems will have top priority simultaneously because they stop process flow. In
the present bay concept, resources are reallocated when an interruption occurs reducing the priority of all
interruptions except for those few on the critical engines near shipment. In the bay system, non-critical
process interruptions are worked on during slack times. In a strict 'flow-line' design, there are few non-
critical interruptions.
Because of the large number of interruptions that exist today in PWEC, I agree with the proposed
implementation plan for the flow-line, which allows engines to be shifted out of the process. To return to
the rocks in the river analogy, if the water level is reduced too quickly, there will be so many rocks that the
organization will be overwhelmed. I believe that PWES should provide additional engineering and support
resources to PWEC in the short term as it goes through this transformation because of the significant
amount of root cause analysis that needs to be done. The additional help can be focused on root causing
problems with a small internal support staff while the majority of the facility focuses on continuing to ship
product. It is only through augmenting the workforce that this transformation can be done quickly and
without significant performance degradation.
6.4.2 Process focus
The second and most important benefit of the migration will be that it shifts the focus of the shop from
being single engine schedule driven to process driven. The schedule emphasis has created two negative
mindsets, the benefits of the migration on both will be answered here. The first, which has been discussed
in this chapter, is fire fighting. As has been shown through both the causal loop analysis and simulation
model results, fire fighting is a destructive resource management philosophy. The focus on saving the
engines closest to the end of the process sacrifices the schedules of those engines upstream thereby setting
up a destructive dynamic. By emphasizing process flow over single engine schedules, this dynamic will be
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prevented from establishing itself, and the productivity will improve because the destructive secondary
workaround loops discussed earlier in the thesis won't be magnified.
The second mindset that will be modified for the better is the 'flexibility' mindset. For the flow line to
work effectively, processes need to be standardized as much as possible across different customers. Under
the bay concept design, PWEC would write contracts to the individual needs of each airline customer to
gain the business because there was little value in driving to standardization of process across customers.
This flexibility just added to the complexity that the shop was required to accommodate. The flow-line
highlights the cost of this variability. As PWEC gains experience with the new manufacturing system, they
will find opportunities where it is advantageous to sell their customers on a reduced option set for a given
overhaul or process step. Minimizing this variation will only improve PWEC's productivity and, therefore,
its performance to the customer. A virtuous cycle is created, where the customer can see the benefits of
giving up some flexibility for increased performance.
6.4.3 Going forward
I believe that the decision to implement the lean manufacturing principles in PWEC and change the
manufacturing system design to a flow-line is a good one. In the long run the productivity of the shop will
significantly improve as a result of these efforts. My one recommendation to the management teams is that
they provide to PWEC additional resources to facilitate the redesign effort and support the process
interruption eradication efforts. If these resources are not provided, the benefits of the flow-line will not be
realized, and the dangerous dynamics, which have been explained earlier, will take effect. It is my
understanding that over the last several months additional engineering resources have been provided to do
just this.
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7 Lessons on applying methodology
This section will focus on the lessons learned in applying the system dynamics methodology to a real
business problem. The section is broken down into four parts, which follow the order in which they were
internalized on the project. The first topic will be problem definition. Developing a well defined,
boundable problem statement is crucial for directing the modeling effort. The second will be
organizational buy-in. The construction of a system dynamics model requires the time of the individuals
who understand the system's structure, the managers, to both help create the model and shepherd its
development. The third topic will be extensibility, which relates back to problem definition. It is very
important that the potential scenarios of interest be highlighted at the start of the project, so the model can
be developed with them in mind. The final topic in this section involves defming what the appropriate
organizational level is for this type of modeling effort.
7.1 Problem definition
The first step in building a system dynamics model is defining the project focus. This is a more complex
process than one might think.
7.1.1 Structure versus process
In discussing the problem definition stage it is absolutely necessary to distinguish between structure and
process. A model structure is the 'map' that reflects the cause and effect relationships of the system being
analyzed. It is the portion of the real world that the model is attempting to reflect. In this model, the
structure consists of manpower, rotable pool, engines and the operational scheduling policies used to
manage them. The process is how that system behaves over time. The output of a system dynamics model
is meant to portray that behavior.
In the early stages of problem definition, it is much more valuable to view the model as a behavior
generation model than a representation of a physical system. It is much easier to define a causal structure
that can generate a behavior than it is to take a piece of system and determine what behavior will result
from it. This point cannot be overstressed because there is a strong tendency to start by describing the
system. The physical structure is palpable to those that exist within it, where the behavior modes are not.
This preference to focus on structure is especially prevalent when there are no obvious behavioral modes,
which can be ascribed to the system.
Both my MIT coursework and the literature 17 emphasize that the modeling process should start with the
definition of critical reference modes (behavior time series) because only then can the modeling effort be
17 Randers, Jorgen, 1980, "Guidelines for Model Conceptualization," Chapter 6 from Elements of the
System Dynamic Method, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
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bounded. These important reference modes lead to the construction of a base set of causal loops that can
generate this behavior. The model is then built incrementally on this foundation.
If the effort starts from the structural side, no litmus test can be applied to determine what components are
critical. Since all cause and effect relationships have some effect on real-world developments, there is a
tendency to include any causal mechanism that someone deems important. This is a significant problem
because without the important reference modes, the modeling effort suffers continual content creep.
7.1.2 PWEC problem definition
The tension between structure and process dominated the problem definition effort on this thesis project.
There was a solid understanding of the structure that existed within Pratt's aftermarket businesses, but there
was not a consensus on the important dynamics that this system created. Throughout the initial project
investigation phase, there was a struggle to define a critical set of reference modes that could be used to
focus the modeling effort. I believe this proved to be such a challenge because there were no strong data
trends within the system. The classic reference modes one looks for are: growth, saturation, collapse,
oscillation or some combination of these four, such as overshoot and collapse (Figure 7-1).
S- -- - Saturation - S curve
Growth
' -Oscillation
Collapse
time
Figure 7-1: Classic system dynamic reference modes
In the aftermarket it was impossible to identify any dominant system components of interest that reflected
these behavioral modes. As mentioned in earlier sections, the sales and profit expectations on the
businesses were significant, so these were the reference modes (growth type) that I used in loosely framing
the modeling effort. The problem statement that was originally defined around these was "what structural
inhibitors to growth exist in the PWEC overhaul business that could preclude it from achieving its sales and
revenue goals", so the focus was on what would cause the system to overshoot and collapse versus continue
to grow.
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7.2 Organizational buy-in
7.2.1 Project importance to business
The development of a system dynamics model requires a significant amount of participation from high-
level individuals within the business. The high level managers are required because system dynamics is
focused on larger system issues. The identification of critical variables and the causal structure that drive
the business is best understood by these people. It is, therefore, crucial that these managers perceive the
project as important. If they do not, the project will languish.
The information is best collected in a brainstorming session where all the knowledgeable individuals are
brought together to jointly hash out the foundation of the causal structure. This environment works best
because it facilitates the convergence of the different 'mental models' that the participants have of the
system. This group then should become the model advisory team that oversees development and ensures
that the project is moving along a path they perceive as valuable.
7.2.2 Systems thinking
System dynamics is not like other approaches to solving problems. It is a method that looks for insight into
the dynamic behavior of a business, which is something not usually included in a traditional data driven
business agenda. This difference is further exacerbated by the use of feedback concepts and causal loop
structures, which are often unfamiliar to the managers that need to be involved. This lack of understanding
demanded that the modeling process involve educating the required participants on the methodology.
7.2.3 PWEC project buy-in
Buy-in on this project was an issue throughout. Though there was buy-in from my management in PWES,
I was unable to convince the PWEC lineA GM with whom I worked on the value of the project. He felt
that all resources should be dedicated to achieving the short-term goals put forth and saw no value in
understanding how the organization could fail in the long-term. Without a strong champion within the
facility, it proved impossible to build an advisory team to oversee the modeling effort. Lacking the team,
the model development process advanced very slowly. It took me as the modeler a significant amount of
time to internalize the different mental models and begin generating system designs that people considered
representative.
To overcome the lack of system dynamics awareness, I developed simple examples to show how the
methodology is applied. I also provided a reference success article, which used the methodology. People
seldom read the article. I found that the rate of understanding jumped dramatically once I had developed a
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strong set of PWEC causal loops. This result reflects what is indicated in the literature, which states that
examples from within the business work best".
7.3 Ease of extension: can't be all things to all people
I am discussing ease of extension after organizational buy-in because this was an issue that I did not
confront until the end of the internship. However, it is a problem that grew out of its start. As mentioned
above, building a model around reference modes is important because it both defines the problem and
focuses the model building. Unable to develop a strong set of causal loops, this model developed as a
generic simulator of the overhaul business. The major focus that was built into it was the ability to model
the system under growth.
Once the simulation model was complete, and the organization began to understand its potential, the
desired uses for the model exploded. Most of these proved infeasible for me to complete within my
timeframe because they would have required a significant redesign of the structure. It is impossible to
design the model to be completely flexible because it is not a perfect replica of the business but a model of
the important cause and effect relationships that drive the dynamic behavior of the system.
Approximations have to be made to enable the model's construction. If the subset of desired uses are not
known in advance, the model will probably require significant modification or rebuilding to incorporate
them. This should be the major motivation for driving to a specific problem statement with well-defined
reference modes of interest.
7.4 Appropriate level of business for system dynamics
7.4.1 Level of aggregation
System dynamics excels at examining the macro issues in an organization. The strength of the
methodology lies in developing an understanding of the dynamics that exists within a business. It is an
insight tool, not a detail decision support tool. Though the tools are very flexible, they are not intended to
replace more traditional modeling tools for very well understood problems such as optimization efforts on
either a supply chain or manufacturing system design. When system dynamics is applied on issues like
these, it should be used to identify what the important factors are in building a more specific model. For
example, in a supply chain question system dynamics can identify where within the chain it is most
beneficial to place the inventory, however, it is not the tool that should be used to determine actual
inventory levels of every Stock-Keeping Unit throughout the chain.
18 Hines, James and Dewey, Johnson, 1994, "Launching System Dynamics" presented at the 1994
International System Dynamics Conference.
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The model, which I have built for this thesis, pushes the lower end of where system dynamics is applicable
given this framework. The model is being applied so low in the business, that it requires a significant
amount of detail to be beneficial. In retrospect, I believe this is too low in the organization to apply the
tool. The productivity tasking and growth insights could have been produced with a more aggregated
model. The detailed manufacturing system design was built into the structure to gain PWEC acceptance
and attempt to provide them a planning tool for the business.
7.4.2 Recommended direction in PWES
Since system dynamics' strengths lie in identifying large structural issues that impact a system over a
longer time period than just a quarter or year, I believe that the methodology is most applicable at PWES'
level. The irony here is that this is where the modeling effort actually started. The challenge lies in how to
structure the problem. There is a shared belief within the PWES management team that opportunities exist
to leverage across businesses and drive the system closer to a global maximization. People see the
structure and intuitively accept the potential for a better design. However, they cannot articulate a problem
around this opportunity. This causes a conundrum because without a well-articulated problem it is difficult
to mobilize resources to better understand the system. I think the only way this can be overcome is by the
management team taking a leap of faith in the short term and investing their time into providing focus to an
effort like this. They are the people that grapple with the business interactions, so they need to be the ones
defining the focus and shepherding a modeling effort on it.
To focus the initial search, I think the PWES managers should concentrate on issues of importance on
which there is significant disagreement over direction. It is where there is disagreement that there are
probably differing mental models of how the system performs. This is an ideal place to use system
dynamics to flush out these disparate mental models and then do the research to determine which of these
models better reflects reality.
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8 Conclusions
As mentioned in the introduction, the aftermarket business is in the middle of a major transformation. The
results in this thesis reflect the state of the business as it was run under the paradigm before this
transformation. The value in this analysis going forward for PWES is two-fold. First, it provides the new
management teams with a guide, or lessons learned, that need to be considered as they manage the overhaul
business through this period of growth. Second, it shows that system dynamics modeling is a valuable tool
for analyzing complex business issues. The purpose of this thesis, when first envisioned, was to take the
first step in developing a simulation model to facilitate decision making across PWES' aftermarket
businesses. Though I believe there are some major issues with developing a generic structural simulator, I
believe that this goal has been achieved.
8.1 Overhaul business modeling insights
The focus of this modeling effort has been the identification of potential structural inhibitors to growth
under the existing manufacturing system design and mindset. The insights that have resulted from this
analysis are in three related areas: PWES' productivity improvement policy, PWEC's policy for staffing
and finally the relative strengths of competing manufacturing system designs.
8.1.1 Tasking insights
The first analysis that was presented highlighted the potentially destructive dynamics that can setup as a
result of productivity levels not achieving the level required by the tasking percentage. Because of the
interdependencies in the overhaul process, productivity shortfalls in manpower and rotable productivity
compound each other because they both draw on the common process buffer of the repair window. Also,
any productivity shortfalls from the tasking level that occur in the process are magnified by workarounds.
The shop, by the very actions it takes to get back on schedule, drives itself further into the hole because of
the inspection burden of CX which drains inspectors from the main overhaul processes.
The recommendation for managers is that this productivity gap must be carefully monitored because the
organization cannot quickly augment its productive capacity. Also, the gap should be moderated based on
the workforce distribution and future sales projections. Today the tasking percentage is constant regardless
of the situation a business is in. This must change. The impact of tasking on an experienced workforce in
a flat demand period is very different than the impact it will have on a young workforce going through a
growth spurt. During a growth phase, the average productivity of the organization is actually dropping as
new-hires start and the experienced workers commit themselves to OJT. A fixed tasking percentage is a
much greater burden on this group.
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A second recommendation from this stage of the analysis is that additional resources need to be provided to
support the continuous improvement efforts. Most of the major improvement opportunities require either
additional resources or significant investments. I believe it has, partially, been the difficulty of these
improvements and this lack of investment which has created the attitude of tasking as a resource tax in
PWEC. To convey the magnitude of the potential gains, a couple of examples are provided:
m Inspectors: A simple time study during one of the kaizen events indicated that >50% of the inspector's
time was spent in information retrieval activities. If a system could be developed that dramatically
reduced this search effort, inspector productivity would skyrocket.
- Mechanics: I can only speculate as to what the productivity benefits would be from a more obvious
material presentation system. On simple assembly processes, the savings may be 10-20% of the
time 19. For more complex jobs, like external tube assembly, the benefit could be greater than 50%.
It is only recently with the change in management teams that PWES and PWEC have started to invest in
PWEC to enable these improvements to be achieved.
8.1.2 Manpower planning insights
The second insight presented highlights the need for a redesign of the staffing policy in PWEC. There is a
significant learning curve which exists in the facility because of the lack of standard work, unclear material
presentation systems and weak IT infrastructure. The productivity hit due to this learning curve is
compounded in the short-term by the hiring delay that exists due to processing and certification
requirements.
To improve the shop's performance, especially during a growth phase, the productivity distribution of the
workforce must be incorporated into the planning process and the hiring process should be streamlined.
Recent hires do not perform at the level of the most experience workers, and, thus, in a growth phase the
workforce level must lead the increase in sales to insure that the shop has ample productive capacity.
As mentioned in the chapter, PWEC is taking action on both of these issues. The lean manufacturing
initiatives that are being pursued to increase the productivity of the shop will have the added benefit of
reducing the learning curve. Most of the efforts are focused on simplifying the information retrieval and
processing steps, which are also the major sources of the learning curve. On the hiring front, efforts are
under way to reduce the lead-time by hiring previously qualified workers from other facilities.
8.1.3 Manufacturing system design insights
The third insight provided from this modeling effort was in the area of manufacturing system design.
PWES is pressuring PWEC to migrate the design from a job shop concept to a lean manufacturing flow
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line. While there is no disagreement over the value of the lean manufacturing principles, there is concern
over the flow-line's ability to deal with the different types of demand variability that the shop is exposed to.
To determine the validity of this point, the simulation model was modified to reflect a flow-line design.
The two versions of the model were then run and compared to determine relative sensitivity. The results of
the modeling indicated that the long-term performance of the flow-line would be better than that of the bay
concept.
The flow-line performed better because of the difference in the operational philosophies of the two designs.
In the bay concept, schedule is king. The result of this individual engine focus is that engines earlier in the
process are starved for resources causing them to fall behind schedule, which locks the organization into
fire-fighting mode. In the flow-line concept, process is king. The result of this flow emphasis is that
Individual process steps are never completely starved for resources. The benefit of this change is that the
fire-fighting dynamic does not establish itself. The shop takes only a short-term performance hit when the
backlog develops. I believe that the modeling effort makes it very clear that the process focus is much
better operationally than the individual engine focus.
The importance of changing the mindset of the shop cannot be overstated. I believe an additional benefit of
the flow-line design is that it will force the organization to emphasize process stability over workforce
utilization. In the classic lean manufacturing mindset, this shift will "lower the water, to show the rocks".
Process interruptions, both internally and externally generated, are a major source of frustration for the
shop. By moving to a flow-line, the shop is going to be forced to root cause and work to eradicate these
process interruptions.
Over the long run the process focus will definitely increase the productivity of the shop because it will
eliminate the constant resetting that goes on as workers are reallocated from job to job. It is important for
both management teams to understand, though, that in the short-term this shift will result in a productivity
drop as the shop concentrates on root-causing problems versus simply providing answers.
8.2 System Dynamics modeling insights
The final, and arguably most important, insight from this modeling effort relates to how future system
dynamics modeling projects should be structured. In reflecting on this project, there are two items that are
critical to assuring the success of a future project: a solid behavioral problem definition and strong
organizational involvement.
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19 One module supervisor stated that mechanics will spend the first couple hours on some module assembly
jobs removing parts from the repair packaging and lining them up on a table to understand what they have
and determine whether all the parts are present.
8.2.1 Problem Definition
It is important to note above that I have stated a solid behavioral problem definition. The intent of the
system dynamics' methodology is to identify the system structure that generates the behavior of interest to
enable managers to develop (and test in the case of a full simulation model) structural changes to modify
that behavior. Without a behavioral focus it is nearly impossible to discern what structural elements should
be left out of the model. This requirement is much more difficult than it seems and it was an issue on this
project. People are more comfortable with components of the system's structure than its behavior, and so
default toward this type of definition. Efforts must be made to resist this tendency.
8.2.2 Organizational involvement
Strong organizational involvement is as critical to the success of the project as a solid problem definition.
The development of a system dynamics model requires a significant amount of participation from high-
level managers because the methodology focuses on larger system structural issues. The identification of
critical variables and the causal structure that drive the business is best understood by these managers. If
these people do not view the project as critical, it will be difficult to involve them, so the project will suffer.
This group also should form the advisory committee, which oversees the modeling effort through the
project, to ensure it stays focused on the critical problem.
8.2.3 Future modeling ideas for PWES
Since system dynamics' strengths lie in identifying large structural issues that impact a system over a
longer time period than just a quarter or year, I believe that the methodology is most applicable at PWES'
level. There is a shared belief within the PWES management team that opportunities exist to leverage
across businesses and drive the system closer to a global maximization. People see the structure and
intuitively accept the potential for a better design. However, they cannot articulate a problem around this
opportunity. To focus the initial search, I think the PWES managers should concentrate on issues of
importance on which there is significant disagreement over direction. It is where there is disagreement that
there are probably differing mental models of how the system performs. This is an ideal place to use
system dynamics to flush out these disparate mental models and then do the research to determine which of
these models better reflects reality.
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10 Appendix - simulation model structure
10.1 Explanation of major subsections
A structural overview of the model was provided in Chapter 5 with the approximations used to represent
the business. In this appendix my goal is to explain in more detail how the bay manufacturing system
design model was constructed. There are four major subsystems within this model: manpower distribution,
engine and module operations, rotable pool management and resource allocation. They will be explained
in order.
10.1.1 Manpower distribution
A major insight from this modeling effort has been the identification and quantification of the learning
curve that exists within PWEC. This experience distribution and learning rate within the workforce have
been represented as an aging chain20 . The aging chain requires the following information: initial
populations in each of the resource levels, the average time it takes for an individual to migrate from one
population to the next and finally the initial inflow rate (hiring rate in this case). For this model I have
assumed that workers progress through the chain with the only exit being retirement. The times to retire
that have been used for the level 1 and 2 workers were calculated as the difference between the average age
of the present population and sixty-five. I did not incorporate people quitting because it is extremely
uncommon in PWEC.
20 This is a common system dynamics construction. These common structures are called molecules and are
individually name.
Thesis Rough Draft page # 83
Mec.
Manpower
lvI 1 time to
retire
mec lvi I
retire rate
lvI 6 reguli
product
lvi 4
product lvi 2 training
derate
Mec Avg.
lvi 1 lvi I mec Prod.
product contrib rate
Figure 10-1: Workforce distribution: mechanics
The figure is read as follows. Mechanics enter the chain from the left at the 'mechanic hiring rate'. They
first enter into the 'mechanic level 6 new-hires' population. They stay in this population for, on average,
the 'training time'. After the training time, they progress into the 'mechanic level 6 regular' population.
As they age, they continue this migration through the chain. There is an arrow from the 'mechanic level 1
retirement rate' to 'mechanic level 2 to level 1 rate' because there are a fixed number of level 1 shop leads.
These positions only come open as people retire. The majority of a worker's career is spent as a level 2
mechanic. They either retire from here or are promoted into a level 1 position if qualified.
Once the population distribution is known, the 'mechanic total work capacity' for the shop is determined.
This quantity is in productive hours. This is simply the sum of the productivity of each population times
it's size. The productivity of each population has been referenced to the level 2 workers, who have a
productivity of 8 hours / day. With the total work capacity known, the 'mechanic average productivity'
can be simply calculated. Some notes on the diagram:
- The 'level 2 training derate': captures the productivity hit that the shop takes when the experienced
mechanics are training the new-hires.
m The 'level 1 mechanic contribution rate': captures the fact that shop leads are not always engaged in
the process of assembling and disassembling engines.
The major variables that are used elsewhere in the model are the 'mechanic total work capacity' and the
'mechanic manpower', which is the total mechanic headcount. A similar aging chain exists for the
inspector population.
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10.1.2 Engine & Module operations
The operations portion of the model consists of a basic structure for each process step, which has been
replicated over and over again. As shown in Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3, the processes have been broken
down into a series of macro level steps. Six of these steps reside in the engine operations area: engine
disassembly, engine BX inspection, engine assembly, engine LX inspection, test and QEC assembly
(external tubing on engine) which is the last step before shipment. Four reside in the module operations
area: module disassembly, module BX inspection, module assembly and module LX inspection. I will
explain the structure by showing the initial two process steps for the engine operations area: engine
mechanic disassembly (EMD) and engine inspector disassembly (EID).
sched days Sched delta Sched days EID Sched delta
EMD EMD -- EID
EMD EID calendar
calendar time time
EMD res EI res
time time
<Customer
Arrival rate> Engines E
await EMD await EID EID epr.EMD arr. EMD EID arr. rat rate
rate depr. rate rt
EMDEID <EID sIBacklog <EMD hrs Backlog eng>
eng> <EMD
workrate>
Figure 10-2: Operations structure: engine disassembly and inspection
Each process step consists of a single stock with an inflow and outflow. The stock is the queue of engines
waiting to be processed in an area, so 'engines awaiting EMD' is the queue at engine disassembly. The
inflow, 'EMD arrival rate', is the rate at which work is being completed at the upstream process or in this
case, the rate at which engines arrive at the shop. The outflow, 'EMD departure rate', is the rate at which
engines are being processed through. The rates are in engines / day and the stock is in engines. The 'EMID
departure rate' is the 'EMD workrate', which is in man-hours and determined in the resource allocation
section of the model, divided by the 'EMD hours / engine', the number of man-hours required to complete
the job. The 'EMD backlog' is the total man-hours of work in queue at the engine disassembly step. This
is used in the resource allocation section of the model.
Thesis Rough Draft page # 85
The challenge in building this section of the model was capturing the location of an engine in the shop
relative to its schedule. This is difficult because the simulation software does not allow for discrete
component processing. It deals only in material flows. Therefore, it does not allow individual engines to
be identified and tagged with attributes. To track an engine's schedule through the process I built the
following structure to approximate a discrete system.
" Assuming a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) processing philosophy, an engine flowing into a process step
goes to the back of the queue.
= As it enters this queue, the 'EMD residence time', queue divided by outflow rate, reflects how long
that engine should take before it exits the process.
= This information is fed into the 'EMD calendar time'. The calendar time variable acts as an
information conveyor where the inflow is transmitted out at a future point in time. The calendar time
of the previous step and the residence time of that step are added together and placed onto the
conveyor. The residence time is then used to dictate how long that information is on the conveyor.
" As the engine leaves the process, the calendar time of that engine is fed into the calendar time variable
for the next process as described.
Schedule information is propagated through the model in this way. The calendar time variables are used in
determining relative schedule pressure for allocating resources in the resource allocation portion of the
model.
10.1.3 Rotable pool management
In the middle of the operations processes is a repair window for both the modules and the engine. As
mentioned in Chapter 5, all the rotable parts for each operational area were approximated by three part
groupings. Parts were segregated into a group based on the differential between the required repair window
and the vendor's capability. For example, parts that took on average five days longer to repair than their
respective allotted repair window were grouped together. The three groupings for the engine parts are D, E
and F, which is the case that will be explained in the figure below.
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Figure 10-3: Rotable pool: engine parts
I will explain the rotable pool model shown in Figure 10-3 through the three stock and flow diagrams from
the bottom up: the part groupings, the module queue and then the engines queue.
- Part groupings (for group D): Parts flow into the repair window from engine BX inspection, 'EGD to
repair center rate' = 'EID departure rate'. These parts spend the average repair time, 'EGD repair
time', at the repair center. When they return, they enter the 'Engine Group D rotable pool'. They sit
here until they are pulled from rotable. The initial rotable inventory level is set to reflect the rotable
investment PWEC is willing to make for the associated parts. It is important to note that there are two
more structures exactly like this one for engine groups E and F.
= Module queue: 'MIA overflow' is the queue of completed modules waiting to begin engine assembly.
The 'MIA departure rate' is the outflow from the module line.
a Engine's queue: 'Engine parts in repair' is the stock of partial engines in PWEC (the parts that did not
require repair) waiting for parts to return from the repair window so assembly can begin. The 'Engine
Part Repair (EPR) delay time' is the time that this engine will sit before it is scheduled to begin
assembly. 'Engine parts in repair' is a material conveyor where the length of the conveyor is
determined by the 'EPR delay time'. The 'EPR delay time' is variable because it is the scheduled time
to start minus the calendar time when the engine actually enters the window. If the engine is behind
schedule this delay time shrinks reflecting how the shop reacts. After this delay time the engine enters
a queue waiting for all its parts to enable assembly to begin. An engine cannot begin assembly without
a module and all three part groupings. The 'EPR max departure rate' variable sets this rate by gating it
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to the smallest stock in the set (smallest stock / time step). The schedule of an engine leaving the
repair window is conveyed to the next process by the 'EPR calendar time' as explained above.
10.1.4 Resource allocation
It is in this section of the model that work is allocated between the different process steps. As mentioned in
Chapter 1, resource groups seldom cross-over organizational boundaries, so I have built this into the model.
For example, engine inspectors only do engine inspection work. The fraction of inspectors dedicated to
engine inspection versus module inspection and CX is based on the present breakdown in the shop. This is
assumed fixed in the model through time. The resource allocation structure will be explained through the
example of the engine inspectors shown in Figure X-X. These inspectors work in two process areas:
engine disassembly inspection and engine assembly inspection.
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Figure 10-4: Resource allocation: engine inspectors
The allocation is determined as follows:
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1. A required workrate is calculated for each area (top right of figure). This is the workrate that would
bring the process to schedule. This workrate is calculated as the total work backlog in that process step
divided by the time available to complete it on schedule. For example:
'Engine Inspector Assembly (EIA) required workrate' = 'EIA backlog' / 'Available EIA time'
'Available EIA time' is the greater of the difference between the scheduled completion date of the
process and the calendar time entering that step and the minimum time required to complete that
process.
'Available EIA time' = MAX('Scheduled days EIA' - 'EMA calendar time', 'minimum EIA time')
This workrate is in man-hours / day.
2. A total required workrate for that work group is calculated, 'EI required workrate' (middle right of
figure). The difference between this and the 'EJ regular workrate' is then calculated to determine the
required additional overtime per inspector, 'additional work required / El' (left portion of figure). The
'EI regular workrate' is the fraction of the total work capacity represented by the number of inspectors
in this work group reduced by the fraction of time lost to miscellaneous forms of overhead such as
vacation time. A required overtime percentage is calculated based on the average productivity of the
workforce, 'El required % OT'. A lookup table, 'OT schedule pressure table', is then used to
determine what the actual overtime percentage will be which is then converted back into the actual
work capacity for engine inspectors, 'El actual workrate'.
3. To determine the allocation of this work to the two processes a relative attractiveness molecule is used.
Individual attractiveness quotients are calculated for each process with the engine assembly process,
'EIA attractiveness', being augmented by a prioritization weighting, 'Relative priority to assembly'.
The relative demands for capacity are then re-balanced. The workrate for a process, 'EIA workrate',
is then calculated as the 'El actual workrate' multiplied by the fraction for that process, 'EIA fraction'.
The 'EIA workrate' is actually the minimum of this workrate and the MAX allowed for the process.
This constraint has been placed on the equation to prevent a job from being completed too quickly
when the workload in the shop is light.
The resource allocation process is structured similarly for the other three work groups: module inspectors,
engine mechanics and module mechanics.
10.2 Model variable definitions
10.2.1 Initialization variables - PWEC lineA specific numbers
NOTE: PWEC specific numbers have been replaced with XX
10.2.1.1 Workforce related
Desired Labor Force= XX
Units: man
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This is the desired labor force for the upcoming year based on the sales projection
Insp Fract to Mod and CX=XX
Units: dimensionless
This is the portion of the inspector workforce dedicated to the module area and CX
Insp Fract to Mod= XX
Units: dimensionless
This is the fraction of the above group dedicated to modules over CX.
fixed fraction.
I assumed that CX took a
Mec fraction of Workforce= XX
Units: dimensionless
This is the fraction of the total workforce which is mechanics.
Mec Fraction to Module= XX
Units: dimensionless
This is the fraction of the mechanic workforce dedicated to the module area
ILII=XX
Units: man
Initial Level
ILl M=XX
Units: man
Initial Level
IL2I= XX
Units: man
Initial Level 2
1 Inspector population
1 Mechanic population
Inspector pop.
IL2M= XX
Units: man
Init L2 Mec pop.
IL4I= XX
Units: man
Init Level 4 Inspector pop.
IL4M= XX
Units: man
Init L4 Mec pop.
IL6NI= XX
Units: man
Init Level 6 New-hire Inspector pop.
IL6NM= XX
Units: man
Init L6 New-hire Mec pop.
IL6RI= XX
Units: man
Init L6 Regular Inspector pop.
IL6RM=XX
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Units: man
Init L6 Regular Mec pop.
lvi 1 product= XX
Units: dimensionless
Level 1 workers' productivity (relative to a level 2 worker reference of 1)
lvl 1 mec contrib rate= XX
Units: dimensionless
Level 1 mechanic contribution rate. As shop floor leads the level I mechanics do not clock time
spent managing people against engines. This is the fraction of the time that they do.
lvI 2 product= XX
Units: dimensionless
Level 2 worker productivity = 1. This is the reference
lvl 2 training derate= XX
Units: dimensionless
This is the magnitude of the productivity derate that occurs to level 2 workers engaged in OJT.
lvi 4 product= XX
Units: dimensionless
lvI 6 new product= XX
Units: dimensionless
lvI 6 regular product= XX
Units: dimensionless
lvl 1 time to retire= XX
Units: day
Level 1 time to retire. Delta in working days between the average age of the level 1 population
and 65.
lvl 2 time to retire= XX
Units: day
Same for this population.
time to become 2= XX
Units: day
Time to gain experience and move up from a level 4 to a level 2.
time to become 4= XX
Units: day
training time= XX
Units: day
Time to hire= XX
Units: day
lvl 6 new DCI fraction= XX
Units: dimensionless
DCI stands for Direct Charged Indirect. This is basically the fraction of the time that a worker is
not charging against engines. New-hires are only allowed to charge a fraction of their time to
engines while in training.
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"DCI % Inspectors"= XX
Units: dimensionless
DCI also covers all training related time losses. This is the DCI for general training. The numbers
for inspectors and mechanics are different because the inspector have more training.
"DCI % Mechanics"= XX
Units: dimensionless
"OT product. (% normal)"= XX
Units: dimensionless
This is the relative productivity of the workforce during OT hours. People are not as productive
on their 12t hour as on their 6h.
Personal Time derate= XX
Units: dimensionless
Miscellaneous time loss.
"Vacation %"= XX
Units: dimensionless
10.2.1.2 Operations related
"EIA hrs / eng"= XX
Units: hour/engine
This is the average hours spent on the Engine Inspection Assembly (EIA) process based on
historical data.
"EID hrs / eng"= XX
Units: hour/engine
Same for Engine Inspection Disassembly (EID)
"EMA hrs / eng"= XX
Units: hour/engine
Same for Engine Mechanic Assembly (EMA)
"EMD hrs / eng"= XX
Units: hour/engine
Same for Engine Mechanic Disassembly (EMD)
"MIA hrs / eng"= XX
Units: hour/engine
Same for Module Inspector Assembly (MIA)
"MID hrs / eng"= XX
Units: hour/engine
Same for Module Inspector Disassembly (MID)
"MMA hrs / eng"= XX
Units: hour/engine
Same for Module Mechanic Assembly (MMA)
"MMD hrs / eng"= XX
Units: hour/engine
Same for Module Mechanic Disassembly (MMD)
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"QEC hrs / eng"=XX
Units: hour/engine
Same for Quick Engine Change (QEC) component assemlby after test by the engine mechanics.
Init EIA Engines= XX
Units: engine
Initial stock of engines at the EIA process step (for equilibrium condition). Note all operational
stocks have been initialized in the same way.
Init EID Engines= XX
Units: engine
Init EMA Engines= XX
Units: engine
Init EMD Engines= XX
Units: engine
Init EPR Engines= XX
Units: engine
This is the number of engines in the part repair window, Engine Part Repair (EPR)
Init MIA Engines= XX
Units: engine
Init MID Engines= XX
Units: engine
Init MMA Engines=XX
Units: engine
Init MMD Engines=XX
Units: engine
Init MPR Engines=XX
Units: engine
Init QEC Engines=XX
Units: engine
Init test engines=XX
Units: engine
init EIA time=XX
Units: day
This is the allotted time schedule for this process step, Engine Inspection Assembly. This
combined with the average daily demand during the period is used to set the initial engine stocks
above. NOTE: All the following initial times are based off the same schedule.
init EID time= XX
Units: day
init EMA time= XX
Units: day
init EMD time=XX
Thesis Rough Draft page # 93
Units: day
init EPR time= XX
Units: day
init MIA time= XX
Units: day
init MID time=XX
Units: day
init MMA time=XX
Units: day
init MMD time=XX
Units: day
init MPR time=XX
Units: day
init QEC time=XX
Units: day
init test time=XX
Units: day
min EIA time=XX
Units: day
This is the minimum time in which an engine can be processed through this step. This quantity is
used to limit the rate at which can be completed from a process step. Purpose: prevent the baby in
one month with nine women scenario. NOTE: Same for all the rest below.
min EID time=XX
Units: day
min EMA time=XX
Units: day
min EMD time=XX
Units: day
min MIA time=XX
Units: day
min MID time=XX
Units: day
min MMA time=XX
Units: day
min MMD time=XX
Units: day
min QEC time=XX
Units: day
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10.2.1.3 Rotable pool related
EGD repair TAT=XX
Units: day
This is the time that this grouping of parts, Engine Group D (EGD), will spend 'at the vendor'.
This number is the dollar value weighted average of the TATs of the parts which make up the
group. All the repair TAT's below were calculated in a similar manner.
EGE repair TAT=XX
Units: day
EGF repair TAT=XX
Units: day
MGA repair TAT=XX
Units: day
This is for Module Group A (MGA)
MGB repair TAT=XX
Units: day
MGC repair TAT=XX
Units: day
Eng Group D rotable stock=XX
Units: engine
This is the initial rotable stock level for EGD parts. This level is set based on the PWEC Line A's
desired level of investment in rotable. The number for all these was determined from discussions
with the materials coordinator for the line.
Eng Group E Rotable Stock=XX
Units: engine
Eng Group F Rotable Stock=XX
Units: engine
Mod Group A rotable stock=XX
Units: engine
Mod Group B Rotable Stock=XX
Units: engine
Mod Group C Rotable Stock=XX
Units: engine
10.2.2 Model equations
"# Mec understaffed"= Mec fraction of Workforce* "Act. Labor Force"-"Mec. Manpower"
Units: man
This variable is used for allocating new-hires between the two workforces: mechanics and
inspectors.
"Act. Labor Force"= "Insp. Manpower"+"Mec. Manpower"
Units: man
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"Auth. Labor Force"= INTEG (Authorization Rate,Desired Labor Force)
Units: man
This was never used in the model. The intent is to capture the labor authorization process.
Authorization Rate=(Desired Labor Force-"Auth. Labor Force")/Time to Authorize
Units: man/day
Rate at which hiring would be authorized.
"addl work reqd / EI"= (El reqd workrate-EI reg workrate)/Total El
Units: hour/day
All of these variables are from the resource allocation portion of the model. It calculates the
required # of hours of overtime that would be required / person for that group (Engine Inspectors
in this case).
"addl work reqd / EM"= (EM reqd workrate-EM reg workrate)/Total EM
Units: hour/day
"addl work reqd / MI"= (MI reqd workrate-MI reg workrate)/Total MI
Units: hour/day
"addl work reqd / MM"= (MM reqd workrate-MM reg workrate)/Total MM
Units: hour/day
Avail EIA time=MAX(Sched days EIA-EMA calendar time,min EIA time)
Units: day
This is the time available to bring the existing engines in this process step to schedule. It is the
max of the following (difference between scheduled completion date and time entered process
step, minimum processing time to complete step). Same below for other equations.
Avail EID time=MAX(Sched days EID-EMD calendar time,min EID time)
Units: day
Avail EMA time=MAX(Sched days EMA-EPR calendar time,min EMA time)
Units: day
Avail MIA time= MAX(Sched days MIA-MMA calendar time,min MIA time)
Units: day
Avail MID time= MAX(Sched days MID-MMD calendar time,min MID time)
Units: day
Avail MMA time=MAX(Sched days MMA-MPR calendar time,min MMA time)
Units: day
Avail MMD time=MAX(sched days MMD-EMD calendar time,min MMD time)
Units: day
Avail QEC time= MAX(Sched days TAT-Test calendar time,min QEC time)
Units: day
Cum Days Late = INTEG ("Late days incr.",O)
Units: day
This is the sum of all the days late of all the engines.
"Late days incr."=MAX(Sched delta Test,O)*"QEC depr. rate"
Units: day/day
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This is the rate at which additional days late are being added to the cummulative total.
act MIA depr rate = EPR act depr rate
Units: engine/day
This is forcing the Module Inspection Assembly (MIA) departure rate to equal the Engine Parts
Repair departure rate. This is part of the rotable pool section where the outflows are linked
together.
EGD pull rate=act MIA depr rate
Units: engine/day
Similar, the pull rate from the EGD rotable pool is equal to the above module outflow.
EGD to PWEC rate= DELAY MATERIAL (EGD to rep ctr rate,EGD repair TAT,EGD to rep ctr rate,O)
Units: engine/day
This is the material delay that mimics the repair vendor cycle for Engine Group D parts.
EGD to rep ctr rate="EID depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
Inflow to engine part repair cycle is equal to outflow from engine inspection disassembly.
EGE pull rate=EGD pull rate
Units: engine/day
Pull rates are equal going to assembly.
EGE to PWEC rate= DELAY MATERIAL (EGE to rep ctr rate,EGE repair TAT,EGE to rep ctr rate,O)
Units: engine/day
Same as above for EGD.
EGE to rep ctr rate="EID depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
EGF pull rate=EGE pull rate
Units: engine/day
EGF to PWEC rate= DELAY MATERIAL (EGF to rep ctr rate,EGF repair TAT,EGF to rep ctr rate,O)
Units: engine/day
EGF to rep ctr rate="EID depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
El reqd workrate=EIA reqd workrate+EID reqd workrate
Units: hour/day
This is the workrate for Engine inspectors that the processes demand.
El reg workrate=(1-Insp Fract to Mod and CX)*Insp Total Work Capacity*(1-"Insp Org. Derate")
Units: hour/day
This is the capacity of the engine inspectors during normal hours.
"El reqd % OT"="addl work reqd / EI"/("Insp. Avg. Prod."*Normal hours per day*"OT product. (%
normal)")
Units: dimensionless
This is the resulting required OT for the engine inspectors given the required workrate and their
average productivity.
"El Act % OT"=T sched press table("EI reqd % OT")
Units: dimensionless
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This is the actual % OT that they will work (from the table).
El act workrate=EI reg workrate+"EI Act % OT"*"Insp. Avg. Prod."*Total EI*Normal hours per day
*"OT product. (% normal)"
Units: hour/day
This is the actual total workrate that the Engine Inspectors will produce to be allocated between
the two processes.
El Total Attract- EIA Attract+EID Attract
Units: dimensionless
"EIA arr. rate"="EMA depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
EIA Attract=(EIA reqd workrate/EI reqd workrate)*(1+ramp(Relative Priority to Assy/10, 10,20))
Units: dimensionless
EIA Backlog="EIA hrs / eng"*Engines await EIA
Units: hour
This is the hours of work sitting at the Engine Inspection Assembly process step.
EIA calendar time= DELAY INFORMATION (EIA res time+EMA calendar time,EIA res time,Sched days
EIA)
Units: day
This is the equation for the information delay that propogates an 'actual' engine's schedule
through the system. The information conveyor is fed the projected queue time for this step + the
time in process to date, the conveyor length is determined by the queue time of the step.
"EIA depr. rate"=min(EIA workrate/"EIA hrs / eng",Engines await ETA/TIME STEP)
Units: engine/day
The outflow from a process step is the minimum of the workrate applied and the size of the stock
in the queue.
EIA Frac=EIA Attract/EL Total Attract
Units: dimensionless
EIA reqd workrate=EIA Backlog/Avail EIA time
Units: hour/day
EIA res time=Engines await EIA/"EIA depr. rate"
Units: day
This is the queue time for a process step.
EIA workrate=min(EI act workrate*EIA Frac,max EIA workrate)
Units: hour/day
"EID arr. rate"="EMD depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
EID Attract=EID reqd workrate/EI reqd workrate
Units: dimensionless
EID Backlog="EID hrs / eng"*Engines await EID
Units: hour
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EID calendar time= DELAY INFORMATION (EID res time+EMD calendar time,EID res time,Sched days
EID)
Units: day
"EID depr. rate"=min(EID workrate/"EID hrs / eng",Engines await EID/TIME STEP)
Units: engine/day
EID Frac=EID Attract/El Total Attract
Units: dimensionless
EID reqd workrate=EID Backlog/Avail EID time
Units: hour/day
EID res time=Engines await EID/"EID depr. rate"
Units: day
EID workrate=min(EI act workrate*EID Frac,max EID workrate)
Units: hour/day
"EM Act % OT"=OT sched press table("EM reqd % OT")
Units: dimensionless
EM act workrate=EM reg workrate+"EM Act % OT"*"Mec Avg. Prod."*Total EM*Normal hours per day
*"OT product. (% normal)"
Units: hour/day
EM reg workrate=(1-Mec Fraction to Module)*Mec Total Work Capacity*(1-"Mec Org. Derate")
Units: hour/day
"EM reqd % OT"="addl work reqd / EM"/('Mec Avg. Prod."*Normal hours per day*"OT product. (%
normal)")
Units: dimensionless
EM reqd workrate=EMA reqd workrate+EMD reqd workrate+QEC reqd workrate
Units: hour/day
EM Total Attract=EMA Attract+EMD Attract+QEC Attract
Units: dimensionless
"EMA arr. rate"= EPR act depr rate
Units: engine/day
EMA Attract=(EMA reqd workrate/EM reqd workrate)*(1+ramp(Relative Priority to Assy/10,
10,20))
Units: dimensionless
EMA Backlog= "EMA hrs / eng"*Engines await EMA
Units: hour
EMA calendar time= DELAY INFORMATION (EMA res time+EPR calendar time,EMA res time,Sched
days EMA)
Units: day
"EMA depr. rate"=min(EMA workrate/"EMA hrs / eng",Engines await EMA/TIME STEP)
Units: engine/day
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EMA Frac=EMA Attract/EM Total Attract
Units: dimensionless
EMA reqd workrate=EMA Backlog/Avail EMA time
Units: hour/day
EMA res time=Engines await EMA/"EMA depr. rate"
Units: day
EMA workrate=min( (EM act workrate-QEC workrate)*EMA Frac/(EMA Frac+EMD Frac),max EMA
workrate)
Units: hour/day
"EMD arr. rate"= (Customer Arrival rate)
Units: engine/day
EMD Attract=EMD reqd workrate/EM reqd workrate
Units: dimensionless
EMD Backlog=Engines await EMD*"EMD hrs / eng"
Units: hour
EMD calendar time= DELAY INFORMATION (EMD res time,EMD res time,sched days EMD)
Units: day
"EMD depr. rate"=min(EMD workrate/"EMD hrs / eng",Engines await EMD/TIME STEP)
Units: engine/day
EMD Frac=EMD Attract/EM Total Attract
Units: dimensionless
EMD reqd workrate=EMD Backlog/sched days EMD
Units: hour/day
EMD res time= Engines await EMD/"EMD depr. rate"
Units: day
EMD workrate=min(EM act workrate-EMA workrate-QEC workrate,max EMD workrate)
Units: hour/day
Engine Mechanic Disassembly gets resources last of the three processes which draw on the
mechanics time: QEC and regular assembly get first dibs.
Eng await parts= INTEG (+"EPR depr. rate"-EPR act depr rate,"EPR depr. rate"*TIME STEP)
Units: engine
This is the stock of engines whose scheduled time to begin assembly has arrived and are waiting
for waits from the repair cycle.
Eng Group D in repair= INTEG (+EGD to rep ctr rate-EGD to Ches rate,EGD to rep ctr rate*EGD repair
TAT)
Units: engine
This is the stock of EGD parts in the repair window: initialized to equilibrium. Others below are
similar.
Eng Group D rotable pool= INTEG (+EGD to Ches rate-EGD pull rate, Eng Group D rotable stock)
Units: engine
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Eng Group E in repair= INTEG (+EGE to rep ctr rate-EGE to Ches rate,EGE to rep ctr rate*EGE repair
TAT)
Units: engine
Eng Group E rotable pool= INTEG (+EGE to Ches rate-EGE pull rate,Eng Group E Rotable Stock)
Units: engine
Eng Group F in repair= INTEG (+EGF to rep ctr rate-EGF to Ches rate,EGF to rep ctr rate*EGF repair
TAT)
Units: engine
Eng Group F rotable pool= INTEG (+EGF to Ches rate-EGF pull rate,Eng Group F Rotable Stock)
Units: engine
Eng at Test= INTEG (+"Test arr. rate"-"Test depr. rate",Init test engines)
Units: engine
The following variables are the engine stocks in the operations portion of the model.
Eng parts in repair- INTEG (+"EPR arr. rate"-"EPR depr. rate",Init EPR Engines)
Units: engine
Engines await EIA= INTEG ("EIA arr. rate"-"EIA depr. rate", Init EIA Engines)
Units: engine
Engines await EID= INTEG ("EID arr. rate"-"EID depr. rate", Init EID Engines)
Units: engine
Engines await EMA= INTEG ("EMA arr. rate"-"EMA depr. rate",Init EMA Engines)
Units: engine
Engines await EMD= INTEG ("EMD arr. rate"-"EMD depr. rate",Init EMD Engines)
Units: engine
Engines await MIA= INTEG ("MIA arr. rate"-"MIA depr. rate",Init MIA Engines)
Units: engine
Engines await MID= INTEG ("MID arr. rate"-"MID depr. rate",Init MID Engines)
Units: engine
Engines await MMA= INTEG ("MMA arr. rate"-"MMA depr. rate",Init MMA Engines)
Units: engine
Engines await MMD= INTEG ("MMD arr. rate"-"MMD depr. rate",Init MMD Engines)
Units: engine
Engines await QEC= INTEG ("QEC arr. rate"-"QEC depr. rate",Init QEC Engines)
Units: engine
EPR act depr rate=EPR max depr rate
Units: hour
"EPR arr. rate"="EID depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
EPR calendar time= DELAY INFORMATION (EPR overflow res time+EPR delay time+EID calendar
time,EPR delay time+EPR overflow res time,EPR delay time+EID calendar time+EPR overflow res time)
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Units: day
EPR delay time=IF THEN ELSE(EID calendar time>=(init EMD time+init EID time),MAX((init EMD
time+init EID time+init EPR time-TIME STEP)-EID calendar time,O),init EPR time-TIME STEP)
Units: day
"EPR depr. rate"= DELAY MATERIAL ("EPR arr. rate",EPR delay time,"EPR arr. rate",0)
Units: engine/day
EPR max depr rate=min(min(min(Eng await parts,Eng Group D rotable pool),min(Eng Group E rotable
pool,MIA overflow)),Eng Group F rotable pool)/TIME STEP
Units: engine/day
This is the variable that determines the rate at which engines can be released from the repair
window into assembly. It is constrained to the smallest pool in the group.
EPR overflow res time=ZIDZ(Eng await parts,EPR act depr rate)
Units: day
This is the residence time of engines waiting for parts. The ZIDZ formula prevents a divide by
zero error.
FINAL TIME = 260
Units: day
This is equivalent to 1 year.
Incremental Hiring Rate=("Auth. Labor Force"-"Act. Labor Force")/Time to hire+Replacement hiring
Units: man/day
This is the rate at which workers are added.
INITIAL TIME =0
Units: day
Insp hiring rate=MAX(IF THEN ELSE("# Mec understaffed">0,0, 1)*Incremental Hiring Rate,0)
Units: man/day
New hires are allocated to either the inspector or mechanic category based on the present
workforce breakdown versus the desired.
Insp lvi 1= INTEG (+Insp lvl 2 to 1 rate-insp lvl 1 retire rate,IL II)
Units: man
This is the stock of people that are level 1 inspectors
insp lvl I retire rate=Insp lvl 1/lvl 1 time to retire
Units: man/day
Insp lvi 2= INTEG (+insp rate 2-insp lvl 2 retire rate-Insp lvl 2 to 1 rate,IL2I)
Units: man
insp lvi 2 retire rate=Insp lvl 2/lvl 2 time to retire
Units: man/day
Insp lvl 2 to 1 rate=insp lvl 1 retire rate
Units: man/day
Insp lvl 4= INTEG (+insp rate 4-insp rate 2,IL41)
Units: man
Insp lvI 6 new hires= INTEG (Insp hiring rate-insp rate 6,IL6NI)
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Units: man
Insp lvl 6 regulars= INTEG (+insp rate 6-insp rate 4,IL6RI)
Units: man
"Insp Org. Derate"="DCI % Inspectors"+'Vacation %"+Personal Time derate
Units: dimensionless
insp rate 2=Insp lvl 4/time to become 2
Units: man/day
insp rate 4=Insp lvi 6 regulars/time to become 4
Units: man/day
insp rate 6=Insp lvl 6 new hires/training time
Units: man/day
Insp Total Work Capacity=(lvl 1 product*Insp lvl 1+(Insp lvl 2-Insp lvl 6 new hires)*ivl 2 product+
Insp lvl 6 new hires*lvl 2 product*(1llvl 2 training derate)+lvl 4 product*Insp lvl 4+lvl 6 regular
product*Insp lvl 6 regulars+lvl 6 new product*Insp lvi 6 new hires)*Normal hours per day
Units: hour/day
"Insp. Avg. Prod."=((Insp Total Work Capacity/"Insp. Manpower")/Normal hours per day)
Units: dimensionless
This is the average productivity of the inspection workforce.
"Insp. Manpower"=Insp lvl 1+Insp lvl 2+Insp lvl 4+Insp lvl 6 new hires+Insp lvl 6 regulars
Units: man
This is the total inspector workforce.
max EIA workrate=EIA Backlog/min EIA time
Units: hour/day
This is the max allowed workrate at a process step based on the minimum time to complete that
step.
max EID workrate=EID Backlog/min EID time
Units: hour/day
max EMA workrate=EMA Backlog/min EMA time
Units: hour/day
max EMD workrate=EMD Backlog/min EMD time
Units: hour/day
max MIA workrate=MIA Backlog/min MIA time
Units: hour/day
max MID workrate=MID Backlog/min MID time
Units: hour/day
max MMA workrate=MMA Backlog/min MMA time
Units: hour/day
max MMD workrate=MMD Backlog/min MMD time
Units: hour/day
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max QEC workrate=QEC Backlog/min QEC time
Units: hour/day
"Mec Avg. Prod."=(Mec Total Work Capacity/"Mec. Manpower"/Normal hours per day)
Units: dimensionless
Mec hiring rate=MAX(IF THEN ELSE("# Mec understaffed">O, 1,0)*Incremental Hiring Rate,O)
Units: man/day
Mec lvl 1= INTEG (+Mec lvI 2 to 1 rate-mec lvi 1 retire rate,ILlM)
Units: man
Same as for the inspectors. This is the population of level 1 mechanics.
mec lvl 1 retire rate=mec lvl 1/lvi 1 time to retire
Units: man/day
Mec lvi 2= INTEG (+Mec rate 2-mec lvi 2 retire rate-Mec lvI 2 to 1 rate,IL2M)
Units: man
mec lvi 2 retire rate=Mec lvl 2/Ivl 2 time to retire
Units: man/day
Mec lvi 2 to 1 rate=mec lvi 1 retire rate
Units: man/day
Mec lvl 4= INTEG (+Mec rate 4-Mec rate 2,IL4M)
Units: man
Mec lvl 6 new hires= INTEG (Mec hiring rate-Mec rate 6,IL6NM)
Units: man
Mec lvi 6 regulars= INTEG (+Mec rate 6-Mec rate 4,IL6RM)
Units: man
"Mec Org. Derate"="DCI % Mechanics"+"Vacation %"+Personal Time derate
Units: dimensionless
This is the combined productive hour derate for the mechanic population.
Mec rate 2=Mec lvI 4/time to become 2
Units: man/day
Mec rate 4=Mec lvi 6 regulars/time to become 4
Units: man/day
Mec rate 6=Mec lvi 6 new hires/training time
Units: man/day
Mec Total Work Capacity=(lvl 1 product*Mec lvi 1*lvl 1 mec contrib rate+(Mec lvi 2- Mec lvl 6 new hires
)*lvl 2 product+Mec lvi 6 new hires*lvl 2 product*(1-lvl 2 training derate)+lvl 4 product*Mec lvi 4+lvl 6
regular product*Mec lvi 6 regulars+lvl 6 new product*Mec lvl 6 new hires)*Normal hours per day
Units: hour/day
"Mec. Manpower"=Mec lvl l+Mec lvi 2+Mec lvl 4+Mec lvi 6 new hires+Mec lvi 6 regulars
Units: man
MGA pull rate=MPR act depr rate
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Units: engine/day
MGA to PWEC rate= DELAY MATERIAL (MGA to rep ctr rate,MGA repair TAT,MGA to rep ctr rate,O)
Units: engine/day
MGA to rep ctr rate="MID depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
MGB pull rate=MGA pull rate
Units: engine/day
MGB to PWEC rate= DELAY MATERIAL (MGB to rep ctr rate,MGB repair TAT,MGB to rep ctr rate,O)
Units: engine/day
MGB to rep ctr rate="MID depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
MGC pull rate=MGB pull rate
Units: engine/day
MGC to PWEC rate= DELAY MATERIAL (MGC to rep ctr rate,MGC repair TAT,MGC to rep ctr rate,O)
Units: engine/day
MGC to rep ctr rate="MID depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
"MI Act % OT"= OT sched press table("MI reqd % OT")
Units: dimensionless
MI act workrate=MI reg workrate+"MI Act % OT"*"Insp. Avg. Prod."*Total MI*Normal hours per day
*"OT product. (% normal)"
Units: hour/day
MI reg workrate=Insp Fract to Mod and CX*Insp Fract to Mod*Insp Total Work Capacity*(1-"Insp Org.
Derate")
Units: hour/day
"MI reqd % OT"="addl work reqd / MI"/("Insp. Avg. Prod."*Normal hours per day*"OT product. (%
normal)")
Units: dimensionless
MI reqd workrate=MIA reqd workrate+MID reqd workrate
Units: hour/day
MI Total Attract=MIA Attract+MID Attract
Units: dimensionless
"MIA arr. rate"="MMA depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
MIA Attract=(MIA reqd workrate/MI reqd workrate)*(I +ramp(Relative Priority to Assy/10,10,20))
Units: dimensionless
MIA Backlog=Engines await MIA* "MIA hrs / eng"
Units: hour
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MIA calendar time= DELAY INFORMATION (MIA res time+MMA calendar time,MIA res time,init
EMD time+init MMD time+init MID time+init MPR time+init MMA time+init MIA time)
Units: day
"MIA depr. rate"=min(MIA workrate/"MIA hrs / eng",Engines await MIA/TIME STEP)
Units: engine/day
MIA Frac=MIA Attract/MI Total Attract
Units: dimensionless
MIA overflow= INTEG (+"MIA depr. rate"-act MIA depr rate,"MIA depr. rate"*TIME STEP)
Units: engine
MIA reqd workrate=MIA Backlog/Avail MIA time
Units: hour/day
MIA res time=Engines await MIA/"MIA depr. rate"
Units: day
MIA workrate=min(MI act workrate*MIA Frac,max MIA workrate)
Units: hour/day
"MID arr. rate"="MMD depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
MID Attract=MID reqd workrate/MI reqd workrate
Units: dimensionless
MID Backlog=Engines await MID*"MID hrs / eng"
Units: hour
MID calendar time= DELAY INFORMATION (MID res time+MMD calendar time,MID res time,init
EMD time+init MMD time+init MID time)
Units: day
"MID depr. rate"=min(MID workrate/"MID hrs / eng",Engines await MID/TIME STEP)
Units: engine/day
MID Frac=MID Attract/MI Total Attract
Units: dimensionless
MID reqd workrate=MID Backlog/Avail MID time
Units: hour/day
MID res time=Engines await MID/"MID depr. rate"
Units: day
MID workrate=min(MI act workrate*MID Frac,max MID workrate)
Units: hour/day-_
"MM Act % OT"=OT sched press table("MM reqd % OT")
Units: dimensionless
MM act workrate=MM reg workrate+"MM Act % OT"*"Mec Avg. Prod. *Total MM*Normal hours per
day*"OT product. (% normal)"
Units: hour/day
Thesis Rough Draft page # 106
MM reg workrate=(Mec Fraction to Module)*Mec Total Work Capacity*(1-"Mec Org. Derate")
Units: hour/day
"MM reqd % OT"="addl work reqd / MM"/("Mec Avg. Prod."*Normal hours per day*"OT product. (%
normal)")
Units: dimensionless
MM reqd workrate=MMA reqd workrate+MMD reqd workrate
Units: hour/day
MM Total Attract=MMA Attract+MMD Attract
Units: dimensionless
"MMA arr. rate"=MPR act depr rate
Units: engine/day
MMA Attract=(MMA reqd workrate/MM reqd workrate)*(1+ramp(Relative Priority to Assy/10,
10,20))
Units: dimensionless
MMA Backlog=Engines await MMA*"MMA hrs / eng"
Units: hour
MMA calendar time= DELAY INFORMATION (MMA res time+MPR calendar time,MMA res time,init
EMD time+init MMD time+init MID time+init MPR time+init MMA time)
Units: day
"MMA depr. rate"=min(MMA workrate/"MMA hrs / eng",Engines await MMA/TIME STEP)
Units: engine/day
MMA Frac=MMA Attract/MM Total Attract
Units: dimensionless
MMA reqd workrate=MMA Backlog/Avail MMA time
Units: hour/day
MMA res time=Engines await MMA/"MMA depr. rate"
Units: day
MMA workrate=min(MM act workrate*MMA Frac,max MMA workrate)
Units: hour/day
"MMD arr. rate"="EMD depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
MMD Attract=MMD reqd workrate/MM reqd workrate
Units: dimensionless
MMD Backlog=Engines await MMD*"MMD hrs / eng"
Units: hour
MMD calendar time= DELAY INFORMATION (EMD calendar time+MMD res time,MMD res time,init
EMD time+init MMD time)
Units: day
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"MMD depr. rate"=min(MMD workrate/"MMD hrs / eng",Engines await MMD/TIME STEP)
Units: engine/day
MMD Frac=MMD Attract/MM Total Attract
Units: dimensionless
MMD reqd workrate=MMD Backlog/Avail MMD time
Units: hour/day
MMD res time=Engines await MMD/"MMD depr. rate"
Units: day
MMD workrate=min(MM act workrate*MMD Frac,max MMD workrate)
Units: hour/day
Mod Group A in repair= INTEG (+MGA to rep ctr rate-MGA to Ches rateMGA to rep ctr rate*MGA
repair TAT)
Units: engine
Mod Group A rotable pool= INTEG (+MGA to Ches rate-MGA pull rate,Mod Group A rotable stock)
Units: engine
Mod Group B in repair= INTEG (+MGB to rep ctr rate-MGB to Ches rate,MGB to rep ctr rate*MGB
repair TAT)
Units: engine
Mod Group B rotable pool= INTEG (+MGB to Ches rate-MGB pull rate,Mod Group B Rotable Stock)
Units: engine
Mod Group C in repair= INTEG (+MGC to rep ctr rate-MGC to Ches rate,MGC to rep ctr rate*MGC
repair TAT)
Units: engine
Mod Group C rotable pool= INTEG (+MGC to Ches rate-MGC pull rate,Mod Group C Rotable Stock)
Units: engine
Mod rep window time=IF THEN ELSE(MID calendar time>=(init EMD time+init MMD time+init MID
time),MAX((init EMD time+init MMD time+init MID time+init MPR time-TIME STEP)-MID calendar
time,O),init MPR time-TIME STEP)
Units: day
Mods await parts= INTEG (+"MPR depr. rate"-MPR act depr rate,"MPR depr. rate"*TIME STEP)
Units: engine
Mods in rep window= INTEG (+"MPR arr. rate"-"MPR depr. rate",Init MPR Engines)
Units: engine
MPR act depr rate=MPR max depr rate
Units: engine/day
"MPR arr. rate"= "MID depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
MPR calendar time= DELAY INFORMATION (Mod rep window time+MID calendar time+MPR
overflow res time,Mod rep window time+MPR overflow res time,init EMD time+init MMD time+init MID
time+init MPR time)
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Units: day
MPR delay time=init MPR time
Units: day
"MPR depr. rate"= DELAY MATERIAL ("MPR arr. rate",Mod rep window time,"MPR arr. rate",0)
Units: engine/day
MPR max depr rate=min(min(Mod Group A rotable pool,Mod Group B rotable pool),min(Mod Group C
rotable pool,Mods await parts))/TIME STEP
Units: engine/day
MPR overflow res time=ZIDZ(Mods await parts,MPR act depr rate)
Units: day
Normal hours per day=8
Units: hour/(day*man)
OT sched press table([(-0.6,-1)-(10,1)],(-0.5,-0.45),(-0.3,-0.25),(-0.25,-0. 1),(0,0),(0. 1,0.1),
(0.25,0.25),(0.3,0.25),(0.5,0.25),(1,0.25),(2,0.25),(10,0.25))
Units: dimensionless
This is the overtime schedule pressure table.
Relative Priority to Assy= XX
Units: dimensionless
This is the gain applied to the relative attractiveness function to increase the work allocation to
assembly.
"QEC arr. rate"="Test depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
QEC Attract=(QEC reqd workrate/EM reqd workrate)*(l+ramp(Relative Priority to Assy/10,
10,20))
Units: dimensionless
QEC Backlog="QEC hrs / eng"*Engines await QEC
Units: hour
"QEC depr. rate"=min(EM Output switch*(QEC workrate/"QEC hrs / eng")+(1-EM Output
switch)*capacity,Engines await QEC/TIME STEP)
Units: engine/day
QEC Frac=QEC Attract/EM Total Attract
Units: dimensionless
QEC reqd workrate=QEC Backlog/Avail QEC time
Units: hour/day
QEC res time=Engines await QEC/"QEC depr. rate"
Units: day
QEC workrate=min(min(MAX(QEC reqd workrate,QEC Frac*EM act workrate),EM act workrate),max
QEC workrate)
Units: hour/day
Replacement hiring=insp lvl 1 retire rate+insp lvl 2 retire rate+mec lvl 1 retire rate+mec lvl 2 retire rate
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Units: man/day
Replacement hiring for retiring employees is automatic.
SAVEPER = TIME STEP
Units: day
Sched days EIA=init EMD time+ init EID time + init EPR time + init EMA time+init EIA time
Units: day
This is the scheduled time at which point a process should be completed. It is equal to the
individual process times of all the previous steps + itself.
Sched days EID= init EMD time+init EID time
Units: day
Sched days EMA=init EMD time+ init EID time + init EPR time + init EMA time
Units: day
sched days EMD=init EMD time
Units: day
Sched days MIA=init EMD time+init MMD time+init MID time+init MPR time + init MMA time+init
MIA time
Units: day
Sched days MID=init EMD time+init MMD time+init MID time
Units: day
Sched days MMA=init EMD time+init MMD time+init MID time+init MPR time + init MMA time
Units: day
sched days MMD=init EMD time+init MMD time
Units: day
Sched days TAT=init EMD time+ init EID time + init EPR time + init EMA time+init EIA time
+init test time+init QEC time
Units: day
Sched days Test=init EMD time+ init EID time + init EPR time + init EMA time+init EIA time+init test
time
Units: day
Sched delta EIA=EIA calendar time-Sched days EIA
Units: day
Sched delta EID=EID calendar time-Sched days EID
Units: day
This is the delta between the scheduled completion time and the actual.
Sched delta EMA=EMA calendar time-Sched days EMA
Units: day
Sched delta EMD=EMD calendar time-sched days EMD
Units: day
Sched delta MIA=MIA calendar time-Sched days MIA
Units: day
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Sched delta MID=MID calendar time-Sched days MID
Units: day
Sched delta MMA=MMA calendar time-Sched days MMA
Units: day
Sched delta MMD=MMD calendar time-sched days MMD
Units: day
Sched delta TAT=TAT calendar time-Sched days TAT
Units: day
Sched delta Test=Test calendar time-Sched days Test
Units: day
TAT calendar time= DELAY INFORMATION (QEC res time+Test calendar time,QEC res time,Sched
days TAT)
Units: day
This is the final calendar function in the model, so this variable provides the actual TAT
performance on each engine as it leaves the shop.
"Test arr. rate"="EIA depr. rate"
Units: engine/day
Test calendar time= DELAY INFORMATION (Test delay time+EIA calendar time,Test delay time,Sched
days Test)
Units: day
Test delay time=init test time
Units: day
"Test depr. rate"= DELAY MATERIAL ("Test arr. rate",Test delay time,"Test arr. rate",0)
Units: engine/day
TIME STEP = 0.125
Units: day
Total EI="Insp. Manpower"*(1-Insp Fract to Mod and CX)
Units: man
This is the fraction of the total inspection workforce dedicated to engine inspection.
Total EM=(1-Mec Fraction to Module)*"Mec. Manpower"
Units: man
"Total MI & CX"="Insp. Manpower"*Insp Fract to Mod and CX
Units: man
Module inspection and CX come from the same work group. In the model a fixed portion of this
workforce was removed for CX.
Total MI="Total MI & CX"*Insp Fract to Mod
Units: man
Total MM="Mec. Manpower"*Mec Fraction to Module
Units: man
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working days per month= 21
Units: day
Customer Arrival rate=IF THEN ELSE(Case number-1,Level Profile,IF THEN ELSE(Case number
=2,Generated Normalized, IF THEN ELSE(Case number =3,half T,IF THEN ELSE(Case number=4,one
T,IF THEN ELSE(Case number=5,two T,IF THEN ELSE (Case number-=6,Scaled Normalized,IF THEN
ELSE(Case number=7,Scaled Quantized,IF THEN ELSE(Case number=8,full,0))))))))
Units: engine/day
This is the variable which feeds the demand profile into the operational portion of the model. It is
set of nested if thens for selecting between different profiles.
Case number = XX
Units: dimensionless
This is the index for the different demand profiles
THESE ARE THE PROFILES:
Full : average demand profile of the last three years.
Generated Normalized : normalized Full profile
half T : normalized demand with a sales ramp = the hiring delay
Level Profile : level demand profile
one T : normalized demand with a sales ramp = the hiring delay
Scaled Normalized : normalized Full profile scaled up to '99 sales level.
Scaled Quantized : average demand profile scaled to '99 level.
two T : normalized demand with a sales ramp = 2x the hiring delay
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